The three in the morning passages require some kind of setting to give them relevance. I hypothesized that, if we look back to ¤w¦Ó¤£ª¾¨äµM¬°¤§¹D we can give one plausible hypothesis about what philosophical "distinction without a difference" he might have in mind. It is the distinction between skepticism and monism (mysticism). Substantively they both have nothing to say (on different grounds) so their difference is mainly one of emotional tone. The skeptic critical and the mystic in awe. This line is also a familiar one from David Hume's Dialogues on Natural Religion where he makes the skeptic and mystic allies against the religious rationalist who wants to prove God exists.
We also addressed the problem of Zhuangzi's attitude toward the sage in this passage. Is it praise for taking the right position or criticism for being arrogant and trying to ground your ¬O «D shi-feithis-not this on the authority of ¤Ñ tiannature. And what would ¨â¦æ be? The necessary balance of pragmatic and natural use of language with a perspectival awareness or trying to have your cake and eat it too.
Finally we noted the implicit grading in a progression from something like skepticism (nihilism), to Monism, Mohist realism, and Idealistic Confucianism. Any conclusion we draw must be balanced against other implicit progressions with different orders. The most interesting thing is the apparent placing of skepticism above the implicit metaphysics of mysticism.
Yesterday's passage ended with a preview today's issue: Having ¬O «D shi-feithis-not this is the source of Á« kuidefect in a ¹D daoguide. A guide is supposed to give ¬O «D guidance, but in doing so it is always defective--a dao that can dao is not a constant dao. This is not a reason to abandon ¹D daoguide or ¬O «D shi-feithis-not this. It is just a reminder of limits. One can't have ¦¨ chengcompletion without Á« kuidefect. Part of having a history that a society, person, heart, etc. will have both. Remember that ¦¨ chengcompletion combines the notion of ordinary (inescapable) growth and experience and prejudice-in becoming someone we pick up one optional perspective and neglect others.
Zhuangzi gives several famous illustrations of this point about ¦¨ chengcompletion and Á«kuidefect . The one in the cartoon Zhuangzi is Zhao playing the Zither. Playing well is having both ¦¨ chengcompletion and Á«kuidefect. Not playing is having neither.
The cartoonist's interpretation is that to play one has to neglect some notes. I doubt this is what Zhuangzi had in mind, but it is a sense that captures the absurdity of trying to avoid Á«kuidefect. It also draws a conclusion that is a reductio of the traditional view--so stop playing altogether. But then he neglects even more notes? If the point is not to neglect them, then the best he can do is play and accept the limitation. Perfection is not in our reach and so foolish to look for it. (V. Mystic theory that perfection is available to those who tap The Dao.)
Then there is a mere mention of Shi Guang playing the bamboo flute--or is it a conducting baton as Giles suggests? And Hui Shi "leaning on a table" Is he teaching or discussing? Most interpreters assume he is doing logic. All Zhuangzi says is that their lifelong pursuits and pleasures made them distinctive. They ¨¦ ¥H©ú¤§¡C©¼«D©Ò©ú¦Ó©ú¤§. This description lacks a clear object. Is it that they wanted to understand what others did not or that they wanted to understand this and not that? I think the former makes a slightly better reading in the context of their having a distinctive human skill. To do so, they had to neglect something. The examples here are interesting.
The discussion of Hui is interesting because in no other place is he assumed to have talked about °í ¥Õ. It suggests that, as we speculated, Hui Shi knew (and taught Zhuangzi?) more than Hui Shi's own relativistic doctrine. It shows some general knowledge about the classical analysis issues. However, his disciples did not get into it and those working on it never reached an end, a resolution, of the disputes. Perhaps this is a characteristic of philosophy, not just of these issues.
Is Zhuangzi critical of this? If this is ¦¨ chengcompletion then everyone is. That is, it is not merely conceptual scholars and philosophers who never reach a final resolution. Having some answers and not others or having no final answers is something we all do.
Again we come to a passage where we have to wonder what attitude Zhuangzi takes to the sage? ·ÆºÃ¤§Ä£ looks a little negative (the glitters from skating in doubt) but it's hard to say. And he follows it with the refrain we saw before in line 34. ¬°¬O¤£¥Î¦Ó´J½Ñ±e . This suggests that Zhuangzi thinks the conclusion of his analysis allows us pragmatically to use the usual. We can't get transcendental, absolute conclusion and we can't avoid having a conclusion so this is a place to rest (or is it the place the Confucian sage rests??) And also again we see this (whatever advice it is) characterized as: ¦¹¤§¿× ¥H©ú .
The next passage is the setting for one of Zhuangzi's more famous "unintelligible" passages. ¤µ¦³¨¥©ó¦¹¡C¤£ª¾¨ä»P¬OÃþ ¥G. I understand this as isn't talk about ©ú merely another perspective? Relativism and realism are alternative perspectives. Perspectivalism seems to have the coherence problem that it must declare itself "merely another perspective." That is all perspectivalism seems able to say. It can't amount to saying something is wrong with realism--and if it does it can translate only into "something is wrong from perspectivalism's perspective." But of course it is!
What is Zhuangzi's defense? Áö µM ±¡ ¹Á ¨¥ ¤§ ! Why shouldn't I invite people to share my perspective on perspectives? Come and try and say it. Maybe if you tried it you would not be inclined to express things from some absolutist perspective again. Maybe . . . Dogmatic absolutism doesn't show sufficient attention to the strength and appeal of other points of view. It tends to undermine cooperation, tolerance, and to be resistant to reform. But are these criticisms of a sound form of realism or only of dogmatism? Skepticism may be a form of realism that is not subject to these perspectival criticisms.
Now the hard (impossible?) part. What is the point of the discussion beginning "There is a beginning, a not-yet beginning to be a beginning, a not-yet beginning to be a not-yet beginning . . . . The dialectic is repeated with a little variation for ¦³ µL . Is having nothing having or lacking? Zhuangzi's non-conclusion is "Now I have said something. . . or did I?
One line of speculation is that the point is denial of the logical (semantic) principle of excluded middle. The later Mohists had defended it. (If we debate about ¬O «D shi-feithis-not this then it is like this is an ox or it is not an ox. Then one of us must be right. Is Zhuangzi's line a sufficient refutation of that point? In any case, his wondering if he has said anything undermines the point (or suggests that if we don't obey the law we may fail to say anything).
Another tempting line is to follow Wittgenstein. A language game has meaning when it plays a role in a way of life. Does this play any role? Can it fail to play a role (the way of life is philosophical puzzle). The puzzle about ¦³ µL was solved in denying that they are predicates (¹ê ¦r ) We can't speak of having having or of having nothing (as if nothing were an object).