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The question is what are the developments in ancient China that are relevant to justifying an interpretive theory of Zhuangzi? We could write books about the social and political conditions and they would be relevant, but it is hard to state any kind of law for how they are relevant. Most arguments from social political conditions to philosophical content are ad hoc. We see the relevance after we have already decided what the philosophy is. Why should we think that Southern origin makes one suspicious of government or large state origin makes one a legalist? The main explanatory factor for beliefs is teaching and reasoning. I teach you A and B and you think to yourself, well if A and B then C. Some other teacher teaches you D and E and you reason, if D and E then not C. Then you decide that one of us was wrong about something. This does allow for regions to be causally relevant because before mass media teachings probably were localized. But clearly by the time of Zhuangzi there was substantial mobility and communication through the entire culture.
It is interesting that The Zhuangzi doesn't criticize or appeal to many other thinkers by name (The Laozi even fewer). However, one major theme is the 儒 墨 ru-moConfucian-Mohist debate. Part of this may be explained as Xiao does as a general opposition to the rule of men, but the logical point seems to be the impasse of moral reform and the different standards to which they appeal (tradition and anti-tradition) in their argument. The rectifying names issue may also be relevant as informing the focus on 是 非 shi-feithis-not this in The Zhuangzi. It is interesting that Mozi plays a pivotal role of starting the philosophical dialectic described in the 天 下 篇 but Confucius and Mencius are not even mentioned.
Tradition histories of Daoism trace it back to the hermits and recluses who criticize and challenge Confucius and Zhuangzi draws on one of these stories. We may think of the anti-government, anti-conventional, anti-political involvement attitude as the key to what I would call "attitudinal Daoism" as opposed to "theoretical Daoism." It does link a number of theorists perhaps, as Xiao suggests, going back to the Shang era. One of the conventional views about Zhuangzi, however, is that he makes Daoism compatible with living in society.
The Legalists are strikingly absent from most accounts of influence on Zhuangzi (unless we include 慎到 ). Yet both schools were "carved out" of the intellectual mix by later historians. It is plausible that they share many common themes and attitudes intellectually. In particular, as Xiao argues, they would both be opposed to rule of men and suspicious of the claims of paradigms such as sages and alleged worthies. Recent scholarship has tagged Huang-Lao (combined worship of the Yellow Emperor and Laozi) as a mixture of Daoism and Legalism--Daoist religion for ruler-types.
Yang Zhu clearly counts as an attitudinal Daoist, but few of the fragments attributed to him show any sign of reflecting on the concept of dao. Graham assumes that Zhuangzi was first a Yangist who "converted" to Daoism as the result of an encounter with the gamekeeper. He does not figure in the 天 下 dialectic. I don't now of any mention of Yang or Mencius in the Inner chapters, though innatist naturalism (the view Graham thinks they share) does get a robust refutation.
The role of Laozi is the most unsettled and possibly the most important. Traditionally, Zhuangzi is treated as having learned his dao from Laozi and this story coheres with the 天 下 account, although it suggests that he did not merely learn, but, like each step in the history, rejected some aspects and developed others. (Notice, however, Graham's suspicions about "pious" emendations which make this less explicit.) Graham argues that The Laozi antedates Zhuangzi and notes that most of the stories about Laozi occur in the later chapters. By the time of Xunzi and Hanfeizi, he is obviously commonplace. Liu places Laozi close to the traditional dating as the teacher of Confucius. So we clearly cannot presuppose a teacher-student relationship. The importance of maintaining the link to sustain a mystical interpretation can be seen by looking at Schwartz' treatment of Zhuangzi. Even if the link is maintained, one could take Daoism to be a form of relativism if you read the Laozi as Hansen does.
Graham wants to remove Laozi as an influence and substitute the Later Mohists and School of Names. Even Schwartz now accepts that one of the differences between Laozi and Zhuangzi is the latter's preoccupation with the advanced stages of semantic dispute. They still agree in portraying Zhuangzi as an anti-rationalist-Graham as a skeptic and Schwartz as a mystic. So his relation to these developments is mainly negative or rejection.
Graham argued that Zhuangzi, unlike the authors of the outer chapters, displays a mastery of the tools of semantic analysis (which Graham mistakenly calls "logic"). These actually help him make his case that the ru-moConfucian-Mohist disputes depend on the possibility of theoretical elaboration of standards of judgment which are as much subject to dispute as their first level moral debate. He seems to make direct reference to the "White Horse" and "Hard White" issues and his close association with Hui Shi is undisputed. Again, this background may support either mystical or relativist interpretation. Mystics would argue that Zhuangzi totally reacted against the trend and relativists or skeptics could argue that he developed it. We will take this point up in discussing affiliation on Monday.
A relatively new entry in the debate about philosophical antecedents is Graham's and Roth's emphasis (following Guan Feng) on the Daoist elements in the Guanzi-in particular the 心 述 and 內 業 chapters. These hint at techniques of cultivation of the mind so that it can transcend the normal limits on knowledge. Graham describes them as a trend toward "subjectivity" which he thinks of as characteristic of Zhuangzi. He includes Mencius and Song Xing (who is included in the 天 下 dialectic)as examples of this development. This gives them a epistemological element of the type I argued was needed for a mystical interpretation. Roth ties it to a claim about the backwards penetration of Huang-Lao theory into the classical period of thought. Huang-Lao doctrine probably claimed a special access to some kind of total, non-perspectival knowledge. Relativist or skeptical interpretations would treat these as superstitious and arrogant assertions of what Zhuangzi showed was impossible.