Rights and Jural Relations

'From Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, edited by Walter Wheeler Cook (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1919), pp. 35-64.

FUNDAMENTAL JURAL RELATIONS CONTRASTED WITH ONE ANOTHER

One of the greatest hindrances to the clear understanding, the incisive statement, and the true solution of legal problems frequently arises from the express or tacit assumption that all legal relations may be reduced to "rights" and "duties," and that these latter categories are therefore adequate for the purpose of analyzing even the most complex legal interests, such as trusts, options, escrows, "future" interests, corporate interests, etc. Even if the difficulty related merely to inadequacy and ambiguity of terminology, its seriousness would nevertheless be worthy of definite recognition and persistent effort toward improvement; for in any closely reasoned problem, whether legal or non-legal, chameleon-hued words are a peril both to clear thought and to lucid expression. As a matter of fact, however, the above mentioned inadequacy and ambiguity of terms unfortunately reflect, all too often, corresponding paucity and confusion as regards actual legal conceptions. That this is so may appear in some measure from the discussion to follow.

The strictly fundamental legal relations are, after all, sui generis; and thus it is that attempts at formal definition are always unsatisfactory, if not altogether useless. Accordingly, the most promising line of procedure seems to consist in exhibiting all of the various relations in a scheme of "opposites" and "correlatives," and then proceeding to exemplify their individual scope and application in concrete cases. An effort will be made to pursue this method:

Jural Opposites

right

no-right

privilege

duty

power

disability

immunity

liability

Jural Correlatives

right

duty

privilege

no-right

power

liability

immunity

disability

Rights and Duties.

As already intimated, the term "rights" tends to be used indiscriminately to cover what in a given case may be a privilege, a power, or an immunity, rather than a right in the strictest sense; and this looseness of usage is occasionally recognized by the authorities. As said by Mr. Justice Strong in People v. Dikeman.1

The word "right" is defined by lexicographers to denote, among other things, property, interest, power, prerogative, immunity, privilege (Walker's Dict. word "Right"). In law it is most frequently applied to property in its restricted sense, but it is often used to designate power, prerogative, and privilege.

Recognition of this ambiguity is also found in the language of Mr. Justice Jackson, in United States v. Patrick 2

The words "right" or "privilege" have, of course, a variety of meanings, according to the connection or context in which they are used. Their definition, as given by standard lexicographers, includes "that which one has a legal claim to do, " "legal power, " "authority, " "immunity granted by authority," "the investiture with special or peculiar rights."

And, similarly, in the language of Mr. Justice Sneed, in Lonas v. State.'

The state, then, is forbidden from making and enforcing any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. It is said that the words rights, privileges and immunities, are abusively used, as if they were synonymous. The word rights is generic, common, embracing whatever may be lawfully claimed.

It is interesting to observe, also, that a tendency toward discrimination may be found in a number of important constitutional and statutory provisions. Just how accurate the distinctions in the mind of the draftsman may have been it is, of course, impossible to say.

Recognizing, as we must, the very broad and indiscriminate use of the term "right," what clue do we find, in ordinary legal discourse, toward limiting the word in question to a definite and appropriate meaning? That clue lies in the correlative "duty," for it is certain that even those who use the word and the conception "right" in the broadest possible way are accustomed to thinking of "duty" as the invariable correlative. As said in Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Kurtz.4

A duty or a legal obligation is that which one ought or ought not to do. "Duty" and "right" are correlative terms. When a right is invaded, a duty is violated.

In other words, if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place. If, as seems desirable, we should seek a synonym for the term "right" in this limited and proper meaning, perhaps the word "claim" would prove the best. The latter has the advantage of being a monosyllable. In this connection, the language of Lord Watson in Studd v. Cools is instructive:

Any words which in a settlement of movables would be recognized by the law of Scotland as sufficient to create a right or claim in favor of an executor ... must receive effect if used with reference to lands in Scotland.

Privileges and "No-Rights "As indicated in the above scheme of jural relations, a privilege is the opposite of a duty, and the correlative of a "noright." In the example last put, whereas X has a right or claim that Y, the other man, should stay off the land, he himself has the privilege of entering on the land; or, in equivalent words, X does not have a duty to stay off. The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to stay off. As indicated by this case, some caution is necessary at this point; for, always, when it is said that a given privilege is the mere negation of a duty, what is meant, of course, is a duty having a content or tenor precisely opposite to that of the privilege in question. Thus, if, for some special reason, X has contracted with Y to go on the former's own land, it is obvious that X has, as regards Y, both the privilege of entering and the duty of f entering. The privilege is perfectly consistent with this sort of duty,-for the latter is of the same content or tenor as the privilege;-but it still holds good that, as regards Y, X's privilege of entering is the precise negation of a duty to stay off. Similarly, if A has not contracted with B to perform certain work for the latter, A's privilege of not doing so is the very negation of a duty of doing so. Here again the duty contrasted is of a content or tenor exactly opposite to that of the privilege.

Passing now to the question of "correlatives," it will be remembered, of course, that a duty is the invariable correlative of that legal relation which is most properly called a right or claim. That being so, if further evidence be needed as to the fundamental and important difference between a right (or claim) and a privilege, surely it is found in the fact that the correlative of the latter relation is a "no-right," there being no single term available to express the latter conception. Thus, the correlative of X's right that Y shall not enter on the land is Y's duty not to enter; but the correlative of X's privilege of entering himself is manifestly Y's "no-right" that X shall not enter.

In view of the considerations thus far emphasized, the importance of keeping the conception of a right (or claim) and the conception of a privilege quite distinct from each other seems evident; and, more than that, it is equally clear that there should be a separate term to represent the latter relation. No doubt, as already indicated, it is very common to use the term "right" indiscriminately, even when the relation designated is really that of privilege; and only too often this identity of terms has involved for the particular speaker or writer a confusion or blurring of ideas. Good instances of this may be found even in unexpected places. Thus Professor Holland, in his work on Jurisprudence, referring to a different and well-known sort of ambiguity inherent in the Latin "lus, " the German "Recht, " the Italian "Diritto, " and the French "Droit, "-terms used to express "not only `a right,' but also `Law' in the abstract,"-very aptly observes:

If the expression of widely different ideas by one and the same term resulted only in the necessity for clumsy paraphrases, or obviously inaccurate paraphrases, no great harm would be done; but unfortunately the identity of terms seems irresistibly to suggest an identity between the ideas expressed by them.

Curiously enough, however, in the very chapter where this appears,-the chapter on "Rights,"-the notions of right, privilege and power seem to be blended, and that, too, although the learned author states that "the correlative of ... legal right is legal duty," and that "these pairs of terms express ... in each case the same state of facts viewed from opposite sides." While the whole chapter must be read in order to appreciate the seriousness of this lack of discrimination, a single passage must suffice by way of example: If ... the power of the State will protect him in so carrying out his wishes, and will compel such acts or forbearances on the part of other people as may be necessary in order that his wishes may be so carried out, then he has a "legal right" so to carry out his wishes.'

The first part of this passage suggests privileges, the middle part rights (or claims), and the last part privileges.

Similar difficulties seem to exist in Professor Gray's able and entertaining work on The Nature and Sources of Law. In his chapter on "Legal Rights and Duties" the distinguished author takes the position that a right always has a duty as its correlative;' and he seems to define the former relation substantially according to the more limited meaning of "claim." Legal privileges, powers, and immunities are prima facie ignored, and the impression conveyed that all legal relations can be comprehended under the conceptions "right" and "duty." But, with the greatest hesitation and deference, the suggestion may be ventured that a number of his examples seem to show the inadequacy of such mode of treatment. Thus, e.g., he says:

The eating of shrimp salad is an interest of mine, and, if I can pay for it, the law will protect that interest, and it is therefore a right of mine to eat shrimp salad which I have paid for, although I know that shrimp salad always gives me the colic.'

This passage seems to suggest primarily two classes of relations: first, the party's respective privileges, as against A, B, C, D and others in relation to eating the salad, or, correlatively, the respective "no-rights" of A, B, C, D and others that the party should not eat the salad; second, the party's respective rights (or claims) as against A, B, C, D and others that they should not interfere with the physical act of eating the salad, or, correlatively, the respective duties of A, B, C, D and others that they should not interfere.

These two groups of relations seem perfectly distinct; and the privileges could, in a given case, exist even though the rights mentioned did not. A, B, C and D, being the owners of the salad, might say to X: "Eat the salad, if you can; you have our license to do so, but we don't agree not to interfere with you." In such a case the privileges exist, so that if X succeeds in eating the salad, he has violated no rights of any of the parties. But it is equally clear that if A had succeeded in holding so fast to the dish that X couldn't eat the contents, no right of X would have been violated.

Perhaps the essential character and importance of the distinction can be shown by a slight variation of the facts. Suppose that X, being already the legal owner of the salad, contracts with Y that he (X) will never eat this particular food. With A, B, C, D and others no such contract has been made. One of the relations now existing between X and Y is, as a consequence, fundamentally different from the relation between X and A. As regards Y, X has no privilege of eating the salad; but as regards either A or any of the others, X has such a privilege. It is to be observed incidentally that X's right that Y should not eat the food persists even though X's own privilege of doing so has been extinguished.

On grounds already emphasized, it would seem that the line of reasoning pursued by Lord Lindley in the great case of Quinn v. Leathem 1° is deserving of comment:

The plaintiff had the ordinary rights of the British subject. He was at liberty to earn his living in his own way, provided he did not violate ome special law prohibiting him from so doing, and provided he did not infringe the rights of other people. This liberty involved the liberty to deal with other persons who were willing to deal with him. This liberty is a right recognized by law; its correlative is the general duty of every one not to prevent the free exercise of this liberty except so far as his own liberty of action may justify him in so doing. But a person's liberty or right to deal with others is nugatory unless they are at liberty to deal with him if they choose to do so. Any interference with their liberty to deal with him affects him.

A "liberty" considered as a legal relation (or "right" in the loose and generic sense of that term) must mean, if it have any definite content at all, precisely the same thing as privilege; and certainly that is the fair connotation of the term as used the first three times in the passage quoted. It is equally clear, as already indicated, that such a privilege or liberty to deal with others at will might very conceivably exist without any peculiar concomitant rights against "third parties" as regards certain kinds of interference. Whether there should be such concomitant rights (or claims) is ultimately a question of justice and policy; and it should be considered, as such, on its merits. The only correlative logically implied by the privileges or liberties in question are the "norights" of "third parties." It would therefore be a non sequitur to conclude from the mere existence of such liberties that "third parties" are under a duty not to interfere, etc. Yet in the middle of the above passage from Lord Lindley's opinion there is a sudden and question-begging shift in the use of terms. First, the "liberty" in question is transmuted into a "right"; and then, possibly under the seductive influence of the latter word, it is assumed that the "correlative" must be "the general duty of every one not to prevent," etc.

Another interesting and instructive example may be taken from Lord Bowen's oft-quoted opinion in Mogul Steamship Co. v McGregor. 11 We are presented in this case with an apparent conflict or antinomy between two rights that are equally regarded by the law-the right of the plaintiffs to be protected in the legitimate exercise of their trade, and the right of the defendants to carry on their business as seems best to them, provided they commit no wrong to others.

As the learned judge states, the conflict or antinomy is only apparent; but this fact seems to be obscured by the very indefinite and rapidly shifting meanings with which the term "right" is used in the above quoted language. Construing the passage as a whole, it seems plain enough that by "the right of the plaintiffs" in relation to the defendants a legal right or claim in the strict sense must be meant; whereas by "the right of the defendants" in relation to the plaintiffs a legal privilege must be intended. That being so, the "two rights" mentioned in the beginning of the passage, being respectively claim and privilege, could not be in conflict with each other. To the extent that the defendants have privileges the plaintiffs have no rights; and, conversely, to the extent that the plaintiffs have rights the defendants have no privileges ("no-privilege" equals duty of opposite tenor).

Thus far it has been assumed that the term "privilege" is the most appropriate and satisfactory to designate the mere negation of duty. Is there good warrant for this?

In Mackeldey's Roman Law" it is said: Positive laws either contain general principles embodied in the rules of law ... or for especial reasons they establish something that differs from those general principles. In the first case they contain a common law (jus commune), in the second a special law (jus singulare s. exorbitans). The latter is either favorable or unfavorable ... according as it enlarges or restricts, in opposition to the common rule, the rights of those for whom it is established. The favorable special law (jus singulare) as also the right created by it ... in the Roman law is termed benefit of the law (beneficium juris) or privilege (privilegium) ...

First a special law, and then by association of ideas, a special advantage conferred by such a law. With such antecedents, it is not surprising that the English word "privilege" is not infrequently used, even at the present time, in the sense of a special or peculiar legal advantage (whether right, privilege, power or immunity) belonging either to some individual or to some particular class of persons. There are, indeed, a number of judicial opinions recognizing this as one of the meanings of the term in question. That the word has a wider signification even in ordinary non-technical usage is sufficiently indicated, however, by the fact that the term "special privileges" is so often used to indicate a contrast to ordinary or general privileges. More than this, the dominant specific connotation of the term as used in popular speech seems to be mere negation of duty. This is manifest in the terse and oftrepeated expression, "That is your privilege,"meaning, of course, "You are under no duty to do otherwise."

Such being the case, it is not surprising to find, from a wide survey of judicial precedents, that the dominant technical meaning of the term is, similarly, negation of legal duty. There are two very common examples of this, relating respectively to "privileged communications" in the law of libel and to "privileges against self-crimination" in the law of evidence. As regards the first case, it is elementary that if a certain group of operative facts are present, a privilege exists which, without such facts, would not be recognized. It is, of course, equally clear that even though all such facts be present as last supposed, the superadded fact of malice will, in cases of so-called "conditional privilege," negative the privilege that otherwise would exist. It must be evident also, that whenever the privilege does exist, it is not special in the sense of arising from a special law, or of being conferred as a special favor on a particular individual. The same privilege would exist, by virtue of general rules, for any person whatever under similar circumstances. So, also, in the law of evidence, the privilege against self-crimination signifies the mere negation of a duty to testify,a duty which rests upon a witness in relation to all ordinary matters; and, quite obviously, such privilege arises, if at all, only by virtue of general laws.

As already intimated, while both the conception and the term "privilege" find conspicuous exemplification under the law of libel and the law of evidence, they nevertheless have a much wider significance and utility as a matter of judicial usage. To make this clear, a few miscellaneous judicial precedents will now be noticed. In Dowman's Case, 17 decided in the year 1583, and reported by Coke, the court applied the term to the subject of waste:

And as to the objection which was made, that the said privilege to be without impeachment of waste can not be without deed, etc. To that it was answered and resolved, that if it was admitted that a deed in such case should be requisite, yet within question all the estates limited would be good, although it is admitted, that the clause concerning the said privilege would be void.

In the great case of Allen v. Flood14 the opinion of Mr. Justice Hawkins furnishes a useful passage for the purpose now in view:

Every person has a privilege ... in the interests of public justice to put the criminal law in motion against another whom he bona fide, and upon reasonable and probable cause, believes to have been guilty of a crime ... It must not, however, be supposed that hatred and ill-will existing in the mind of a prosecutor must of necessity destroy the privilege, for it is not impossible that such hatred and ill-will may have very natural and pardonable reasons for existing.

Applying the term in relation to the subject of property, Mr. Justice Foster, of the Supreme Court of Maine, said in the case of Pulitzer v. Livingston.

It is contrary to the policy of the law that there should be any outstanding titles, estates, or powers, by the existence, operation or exercise of which, at a period of time beyond lives in being and twenty-one years and a fraction thereafter, the complete and unfettered enjoyment of an estate, with all the rights, privileges and powers incident to ownership, should be qualified or impeded.

As a final example in the present connection, the language of Baron Alderson in Hilton v. Eckerly" may be noticed:

Prima facie it is the privilege of a trader in a free country, in all matters not contrary to law, to regulate his own mode of carrying them on according to his discretion and choice.

The closest synonym of legal "privilege" seems to be legal "liberty" or legal "freedom." This is sufficiently indicated by an unusually discriminating and instructive passage in Mr. Justice Cave's opinion in Allen v. Flood. 17

The personal rights with which we are most familiar are: 1. Rights of reputation; 2. Rights of bodily safety and freedom; 3. Rights of property; or, in other words, rights relating to mind, body and estate, . . .

In my subsequent remarks the word "right" will, as far as possible, always be used in the above sense; and it is the more necessary to insist on this as during the argument at your Lordship's bar it was frequently used in a much wider and more indefinite sense. Thus it was said that a man has a perfect right to fire off a gun, when all that was meant, apparently, was that a man has a freedom or liberty to fire off a gun, so long as he does not violate or infringe any one's rights in doing so, which is a very different thing from a right, the violation or disturbance of which can be remedied or prevented by legal process.

While there are numerous other instances of the apt use of the term "liberty," both in judicial opinions and in conveyancing documents, it is by no means so common or definite a word as "privilege." The former term is far more likely to be used in the sense of physical or personal freedom (i.e., absence of physical restraint), as distinguished from a legal relation; and very frequently there is the connotation of general political liberty, as distinguished from a particular relation between two definite individuals. Besides all this, the term "privilege" has the advantage of giving us, as a variable, the adjective "privileged." Thus, it is frequently convenient to speak of a privileged act, a privileged transaction, a privileged conveyance, etc.

The term "license," sometimes used as if it were synonymous with "privilege," is not strictly appropriate. This is simply another of those innumerable cases in which the mental and physical facts are so frequently confused with the legal relation which they create. Accurately used, "license" is a generic term to indicate a group of operative facts required to create a particular privilege,-this being especially evident when the word is used in the common phrase "leave and license." This point is brought out by a passage from Mr. Justice Adam's opinion in Clifford v. 0'Neill. 18

A license is merely a permission to do an act which, without such permission, would be amount to a trespass ... nor will the continuous enjoyment of the privilege conferred, for any period of time cause it to ripen into a tangible interest in the land affected.

Powers and Liabilities. As indicated in the preliminary scheme of jural relations, a legal power (as distinguished, of course, from a mental or physical power) is the opposite of legal disability, and the correlative of legal liability. But what is the intrinsic nature of a legal power as such? Is it possible to analyze the conception represented by this constantly employed and very important term of legal discourse? Too close an analysis might seem metaphysical rather than useful; so that what is here presented is intended only as an approximate explanation, sufficient for all practical purposes.

A change in a given legal relation may result (1) from some superadded fact or group of facts not under the volitional control of a human being (or human beings); or (2) from some superadded fact or groups of facts which are under the volitional control of one or more human beings. As regards the second class of cases, the person (or persons) whose volitional control is paramount may be said to have the (legal) power to effect the particular change of legal relations that is involved in the problem.

This second class of cases-powers in the technical sense-must now be further considered. The nearest synonym for any ordinary case seems to be (legal) "ability"-the latter being obviously the opposite of "inability," or "disability." The term "right," so frequently and loosely used in the present connection is an unfortunate term for the purpose, -a not unusual result being confusion of thought as well as ambiguity of expression. The term "capacity" is equally unfortunate; for, as we have already seen, when used with discrimination, this word denotes a particular group of operative facts, and not a legal relation of any kind.

Many examples of legal powers may readily be given. Thus, X, the owner of ordinary personal property "in a tangible object" has the power to extinguish his own legal interest (rights, powers, immunities, etc.) through that totality of operative facts known as abandonment; and-simultaneously and correlatively-to create in other persons privileges and powers relating to the abandoned object,-e. g., the power to acquire title to the latter by appropriating it. Similarly, X has the power to transfer his interest to Y, that is to extinguish his own interest and concomitantly create in Y a new and corresponding interest. So also X has the power to create contractual obligations of various kinds. Agency cases are likewise instructive. By the use of some metaphorical expression such as the Latin, qui facit per alium, facit per se* the true nature of agency relations is only too frequently obscured. The creation of an agency relation involves, inter alia, the grant of legal powers to the so-called agent, and the creation of correlative liabilities in the principal. That is to say, one party, P, has the power to create agency powers in another party, A,-for example, the power to convey P's property, the power to impose (so called) contractual obligations on P, the power to discharge a debt owing to P, the power to "receive" title to property so that it shall vest in P, and so forth. In passing, it may be well to observe that the term "authority," so frequently used in agency cases, is very ambiguous and slippery in its connotation. Properly employed in the present connection, the word seems to be an abstract or qualitative term corresponding to the concrete "authorization,"the latter consisting of a particular group of operative facts taking place between the principal and the agent. All too often, however, the term in question is so used as to blend and confuse these operative facts with the powers and privileges thereby created in the agent. A careful discrimination in these particulars would, it is submitted, go far toward clearing up certain problems in the law of agency.

Essentially similar to the powers of agents are powers of appointment in relation to property interests. So, too, the powers of public officers are, intrinsically considered, comparable to those of agents,-for example, the power of a sheriff to sell property under a writ of execution. The power of a donor, in a gift causa mortis, to revoke the gift and divest the title of the donee is another clear example of the legal quantities now being considered; also a pledgee's statutory power of sale.

There are, on the other hand, cases where the true nature of the relations involved has not, perhaps, been so clearly recognized. Thus, in the case of a conditional sale of personalty, assuming the vendee's agreement has been fully performed ex'"He who acts through another acts himself." That is, the acts of a person's legal agent may be attributed to the person (the principal) himself.

cept as to the payment of the last instalment and the time for the latter has arrived, what 19 the interest of such vendee as regards the property? Has he, as so often assumed, merely a contractural right to have title passed to him by consent of the vendor, on final payment being made; or has he, irrespective of the consent of the vendor the power to divest the title of the latter and to acquire a perfect title for himself? Though the language of the cases 19 not always so clear as it might be, the vendee seems to have precisely that sort of power. Fundamentally considered, the typical escrow transaction in which the performance of conditions 19 within the volitional control of the grantee, 19 somewhat similar to the conditional sale of personalty; and, when reduced to its lowest terms, the problem seems easily to be solved in terms of legal powers. Once the "escrow" 19 formed, the grantor still has the legal title; but the grail,,-,:e has an irrevocable power to divest that title b performance of certain conditions (i. e., the addition of various operative facts), and concomitantly to vest title in himself. While such power 19 outstanding, the grantor is, of course, subject to a correlative liability to have his title divested. Similarly, in the case of a conveyance of land in fee simple subject to condition subsequent, after the condition has been performed, the original grantor 19 commonly said to have a "right of entry." If, however, the problem 19 analyzed, it will be seen that, as of primary importance, the grantor has two legal quantities, (1) the privilege of entering, and (2) the power, by means of such entry, to divest the estate of the grantee. The latter's estate endures, subject to the correlative liability of being divested, until such power 19 actually exercised.

Passing now to the field of contracts, suppose A mails a letter to B offering to sell the former's land, Whiteacre, to the latter for ten thousand dollars, such letter being duly received. The operative facts thus far mentioned have created a power as regards B and a correlative liability as regards A. B, by dropping a letter of acceptance in the box, has the power to impose a potential or inchoate obligation ex contractu on A and himself; and, assuming that the land 19 worth fifteen thousand dollars, that particular legal quantitythe "power plus liability" relation between A and B-seems to be worth about five thousand dollars to B. The liability of A will continue for a reasonable time unless, in exercise of his power to do so, A previously extinguishes it by that series of operative facts known as "revocation." These last matters are usually described by saying that A's "offer" will "continue" or "remain open" for a reasonable time, or for the definite time actually specified, unless A previously "withdraws" or "revokes" such offer. While, no doubt, in the great majority of cases no harm results from the use of such expressions, yet these forms of statement seem to represent a blending of non-legal and legal quantities which, in any problem requiring careful reasoning, should preferably be kept distinct. An offer, considered as a series of physical and mental operative facts, has spent its force and become functus officio as soon as such series has been completed by the "offeree's receipt." The real question 19 therefore as to the legal effect, if any, at that moment of time. If the latter consist of B's power and A's correlative liability, manifestly it 19 those legal relations that "continue" or "remain open" until modified by revocation or other operative facts. What has thus far been said concerning contracts completed by mail would seem to apply, mutatis mutandis, to every type of contract. Even where the parties are in the presence of each other, the offer creates a liability against the offerer, together with a correlative power in favor of the offeree. The only distinction for present purposes would be in the fact that such power and such liability would expire within a very short period of time.

Perhaps the practical justification for this method of analysis 19 somewhat greater in relation to the subject of options. In his able work on Contracts, 19 Langdell says:

If the offerer stipulates that his offer shall remain open for a specified time, the first question 19 whether such stipulation constitutes a binding contract ... When such a stipulation 19 binding, the further question arises, whether it makes the offer irrevocable. It has been a common opinion that it does, but that 19 clearly a mistake.... An offer 19 merely one of the elements of a contract; and it 19 indispensable to the making of a contract that the wills of the contracting parties do, in legal contemplation, concur at the moment of making it. An offer, therefore, which the party making it has no power to revoke, 19 a legal impossibility. Moreover, if the stipulation should make the offer irrevocable, it would be a contract incapable of being broken; which 19 also a legal impossibility. The only effect, therefore, of such a stipulation 19 to give the offeree a claim for damages if the stipulation be broken by revoking the offer.

The foregoing reasoning ignores the fact that an ordinary offer ipso facto creates a legal relation -a legal power and a legal liability,-and that it 19 this relation (rather than the physical and men-

tal facts constituting the offer) that "remains open." If these points be conceded, there seems no difficulty in recognizing a unilateral option agreement supported by consideration or embodied in a sealed instrument as creating in the optionee an irrevocable power to create, at any time within the period specified, a bilateral obligation as between himself and the giver of the option. Correlatively to that power, there would of course, be a liability against the option-giver which he himself would have no power to extinguish. The courts seem to have no difficulty in reaching precisely this result as a matter of substance; though their explanations are always in terms of "withdrawal of offer," and similar expressions savoring of physical and mental quantities.

In connection with the powers and liabilities created respectively by an ordinary offer and by an option, it 19 interesting to consider the liabilities of a person engaged in a "public calling"; for, as it seems, such a party's characteristic position is, one might almost say, intermediate between that of an ordinary contractual offerer and that of an option-giver. It has indeed been usual to assert that such a party 19 (generally speaking) under a present duty to all other parties; but this 19 believed to be erroneous. Thus, Professor Wyman, in his work on Public Service Companies, 20 says: The duty placed upon every one exercising a public calling 19 primarily a duty to serve every man who 19 a member of the public.... It 19 somewhat difficult to place this exceptional duty in our legal system. . . . The truth of the matter 19 that the obligation resting upon one who has undertaken the performance of public duty 19 sui generis.

It 19 submitted that the learned writer's difficulties arise primarily from a failure to see that the innkeeper, the common carrier and others similarly "holding out" are under present liabilities rather than present duties Correlative to those liabilities are the respective powers of the various members of the public. Thus, for example, a traveling member of the public has the legal power, by making proper application and sufficient tender, to impose a duty on the innkeeper to receive him as a guest. For breach of the duty thus created an action would of course lie. It would therefore seem that the innkeeper is, to some extent, like one who had given an option to every traveling member of the public. He differs as regards net legal effect, only because he can extinguish his present liabilities and the correlative powers of the traveling members of the public by going out of business Yet, on the other hand, his liabilities are more onerous than that of an ordinary contractual offerer, for he cannot extinguish his liabilities by any simple performance akin to revocation of offer.

As regards all the "legal powers" thus far considered, possibly some caution 19 necessary. If, for example, we consider the ordinary property owner's power of alienation, it 19 necessary to distinguish carefully between the legal power, the physical power to do the things necessary for the "exercise" of the legal power, and, finally, the privilege of doing these things-that is, if such privilege does really exist. It may or may not. Thus, if X, a landowner, has contracted with Y that the former will not alienate to Z, the acts of X necessary to exercise the power of alienating to Z are privileged as between X and every party other than Y; but, obviously, as between X and Y, the former has no privilege of doing the necessary acts; or conversely, he 19 under a duty to Y not to do what 19 necessary to exercise the power.

In view of what has already been said, very little may suffice concerning a liability as such. The latter, as we have seen, 19 the correlative of power, and the opposite of immunity (or exemption). While no doubt the term "liability" 19 often loosely used as a synonym for "duty," or "obligation," it 19 believed, from an extensive survey of judicial precedents, that the connotation already adopted as most appropriate to the word in question 19 fully justified. A few cases tending to indicate this will now be noticed. In McNeer v McNeer, 21 Mr. Justice Magruder balanced the conceptions of power and liability as follows:

So long as she lived, however, his interest in her land lacked those elements of property, such as power of disposition and liability to sale on execution which had formerly given it the character of a vested estate.

In Booth v. Commonwealth, 22 the court had to construe a Virginia statute providing "that all free white male persons who are twenty-one years of age and not over sixty, shall be liable to serve as jurors, except as hereinafter provided." It 19 plain that this enactment imposed only a liability and not a duty. It 19 a liability to have a duty created. The latter would arise only when, in exercise of their powers, the parties litigant and the court officers had done what was necessary to impose a specific duty to perform the functions of a juror. The language of the court, by Moncure, J., 19 particularly apposite as indicating that liability 19 the opposite, or negative, of immunity (or exemption):

The word both expressed and implied 19 "liable," which has a very different meaning from "qualified" ... Its meaning 19 "bound" or "obliged." . . . A person exempt from serving on juries 19 not liable to serve, and a person not liable to serve 19 exempt from serving. The terms seem to be convertible.

A further good example of judicial usage 19 to be found in Emery v. Clough. 23 Referring to a gift causa mortis and the donee's liability to have his already vested interest divested by the donor's exercise of his power of revocation, Mr. Justice Smith said:

The title to the gift causa mortis passed by the delivery, defeasible only in the lifetime of the donor, and his death perfects the title in the donee by terminating the donor's right or power of defeasance. The property passes from the donor to the donee directly ... and after his death it 19 liable to be divested only in favor of the donor's creditors.... His right and power ceased with his death.

Perhaps the nearest synonym 19 "subjection" or "responsibility." As regards the latter word, a passage from Mr. Justice Day's opinion in McElfresh v. Kirkendall 19 interesting:

The words "debt' and "liability" are not synonymous, and they are not commonly so understood. As applied to the pecuniary relations of the parties, liability 19 a term of broader significance than debt.... Liability 19 responsibility.

While the term in question has the broad generic connotation already indicated, no doubt it very frequently indicates that specific form of liability (or complex of liabilities) that 19 correlative to a power (or complex of powers) vested in a party litigant and the various court officers. Such was held to be the meaning of a certain California statute involved in the case of Lattin x Gillette. 25 Said Mr. Justice Harrison:

The word "liability" 19 the condition in which an individual 19 placed after a breach of his contract, or a violation of any obligation resting upon him. It 19 defined by Bouvier to be responsibility.

Immunities and Disabilities. As already brought out, immunity 19 the correlative of disability ("no-power"), and the opposite, or negation, of liability. Perhaps it will also be plain, from the preliminary outline and from the discussion down to this point, that a power bears the same general contrast to an immunity that a right does to a privilege. A right 19 one's affirmative claim against another, and a privilege 19 one's freedom from the right or claim of another. Similarly, a power 19 one's affirmative "control" over a given legal relation as against another; whereas an immunity 19 one's freedom from the legal power or "control" of another as regards some legal relation.

A few examples may serve to make this clear. X, a landowner, has, as we have seen, power to alienate to Y or to any other ordinary party. On the other hand, X has also various immunities as against Y, and all other ordinary parties. For Y 19 under a disability (i.e., has no power) so far as shifting the legal interest either to himself or to a third party 19 concerned; and what 19 true of Y applies similarly to every one else who has not by virtue of special operative facts acquired a power to alienate X's property. If, indeed, a sheriff has been duly empowered by a writ of execution to sell X's interest, that 19 a very different matter: correlative to such sheriffs power would be the liability of X,-the very opposite of immunity (or exemption). It 19 elementary, too, that as against the sheriff, X might be immune or exempt in relation to certain parcels of property, and be liable as to others. Similarly, if an agent has been duly appointed by X to sell a given piece of property, then, as to the latter, X has, in relation to such agent, a liability rather than an immunity.

For over a century there has been, in this country, a great deal of important litigation involving immunities from powers of taxation. If there be any lingering misgivings as to the "practical" importance of accuracy and discrimination in legal conceptions and legal terms, perhaps some of such doubts would be dispelled by considering the numerous cases on valuable taxation exemptions coming before the United States Supreme Court. Thus, in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Tennessee," Mr. Justice Peckham expressed the views of the court as follows:

In granting to the De Soto Company "all the rights, privileges, and immunities" of the Bluff City Company, all words are used which could be regarded as necessary to carry the exemption from taxation possessed by the Bluff City Company; while in the next following grant, that of the charter of the plaintiff in error, the word "immunity" 19 omitted. Is there any meaning to be attached to that omission, and if so, what? We think some meaning 19 to be attached to it. The word "immunity" expresses more clearly and definitely an intention to include therein an exemption from taxation than does either of the other words. Exemption from taxation 19 more accurately described as an "immunity"

than as a privilege, although it 19 not to be denied that the latter word may sometimes and under some circumstances include such exemptions.

In Morgan v Louisiana27 there 19 an instructive discussion from the pen of Mr. Justice Field. In holding that on a foreclosure sale of the franchise and property of a railroad corporation an immunity from taxation did not pass to the purchaser, the learned judge said:

As has been often said by this court, the whole community 19 interested in retaining the power of taxation undiminished.... The exemption of the property of the company from taxation, and the exemption of its officers and servants from jury and military duty, were both intended for the benefit of the company, and its benefit alone. In their personal character they are analogous to exemptions from execution of certain property of debtors, made by laws of several of the states.

So far as immunities are concerned, the two judicial discussions last quoted concern respectively problems of interpretation and problems of alienability. In many other cases difficult constitutional questions have arisen as the result of statutes impairing or extending various kinds of immunities. Litigants have, from time to time, had occasion to appeal both to the clause against impairment of the obligation of contracts and to the provision against depriving a person of property without due process of law. This has been especially true as regards exemptions from taxation and exemptions from execution.

If a word may now be permitted with respect to mere terms as such, the first thing to note 19 that the word "right" 19 overworked in the field of immunities as elsewhere. As indicated, however, by the judicial expressions already quoted, the best synonym is, of course, the term "exemption." It 19 instructive to note, also, that the word "impunity" has a very similar connotation. This 19 made evident by the interesting discriminations of Lord Chancellor Finch in Skelton v. Skelton, 28 a case decided in 1677:

But this I would be no means allow, that equity should enlarge the restraints of the disabilities introduced by act of parliament; and as to the granting of injunctions to stay waste, I took a distinction where tenant hath only impunitatem, and where he hath jus in arboribus. If the tenant have only a bare indemnity or exemption from an action (at law), if he committed waste, there it 19 fit he should be restrained by injuction from committing it.

In the latter part of the preceding discussion, eight conceptions of the law have been analyzed and compared in some detail, the purpose having been to exhibit not only their intrinsic meaning and scope, but also their relations to one another and the methods by which they are applied, in judicial reasoning, to the solution of concrete problems of litigation. Before concluding this branch of the discussion a general suggestion may be ventured as to the great practical importance of a clear appreciation of the distinctions and discriminations set forth. If a homely metaphor be permitted, these eight conceptions,-rights and duties, privileges and no-rights, powers and liabilities, immunities and disabilities,-seem to be what may be called "the lowest common denominators of the law." Ten fractions (1/3, 2/5, etc.) may, superficially, seem so different from one another as to defy comparison. If, however, they are expressed in terms of their lowest common denominators (5/15, 6/15, etc.), comparison becomes easy, and fundamental similarity may be discovered. The same thing 19 of course true as regards the lowest generic conceptions to which any and all "legal quantities" may be reduced.

Reverting, for example, to the subject of powers, it might be difficult at first glance to discover any essential and fundamental similarity between conditional sales of personalty, escrow transactions, option agreements, agency relations, powers of appointment, etc. But if all these relations are reduced to their lowest generic terms,the conceptions of legal power and legal liability are seen to be dominantly, though not exclusively, applicable throughout the series. By such a process it becomes possible not only to discover essential similarities and illuminating analogies in the midst of what appears superficially to be infinite and hopeless variety, but also to discern common principles of justice and policy underlying the various jural problems involved. An indirect, yet very practical, consequence 19 that it frequently becomes feasible, by virtue of such analysis, to use as persuasive authorities judicial precedents that might otherwise seem altogether irrelevant. If this point be valid with respect to powers, it would seem to be equally so as regards all of the other basic conceptions of the law. In short, the deeper the analysis, the greater becomes one's perception of fundamental unity and harmony in the law.

NOTES

1.         (1852) 7 How. Pr., 124, 130.

2.         (1893) 54 Fed. Rep., 338, 348.

3. (1871) 3 Heisk. (Tenn.), 287, 306-307.

4.         (1894) 10 Ind. App., 60; 37 N.E., 303, 304.

5.         (1883) 8 App. Cas., at p. 597.

6.         Elements of Jurisprudence (10th ed.), 83. 7. Ibid., 82.

8.         See Nature and Sources of Law (1909), secs. 25, 45, 184.

9.         Nature and Sources of Law (1909) sec. 48.

10.        (1901) A.C., 495, 534.

11.        (1889) 23 Q.B.D., 59.

12.        (Dropsie trans.) secs. 196-197.

13.        (1583) 9 Coke, 1.

14.        (1898) A.C., 1, 19.

15.        (1896) 89 Me., 359.

16.        (1856) 6 E. & B., 47, 74.

17.        (1898) A.C., 1, 29.

18.        (1896) 12 App. Div., 17; 42 N.Y. Sup., 607, 609.

19.        Langdell, Summary of Contracts (2d ed., 1880) Sec. 178.

20.        Secs.330-333.

21.        (1892) 142 111., 388, 397.

22.        (1861) 16 Grat., 519, 525.

23.        (1885) 63 N.H., 552.

24.        (1873) 36 Ia., 224, 226.

25.        (1892) 95 Cal., 317, 319. 26. (1895) 161 U.S., 174, 177. 27.          (1876) 93 U.S., 217, 222.

28.        (1677) 2 Swanst., 170.