The 1967 riots represented a landmark in the history of Hong Kong. The riots were initially triggered by an industrial dispute that escalated into violent clashes between the workers and the police. Subsequently the local leftists used the opportunity to challenge the Hong Kong government. There are two major arguments on the riots. On the one hand, local leftists saw the internal social contradictions and discontents among the Hong Kong people as the roots of the confrontations. On the other hand, the British Hong Kong Authority regarded the riots as the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, and that the leftists received very little local support.

This article intends to fill the gap of these two arguments by studying the internal dynamics of the government, the masses, and the elites of Hong Kong during the riots. Specifically, the paper tries to address the following questions:

By focussing on these questions this article hopes to contribute to a renewed understanding of the riots, which are still relatively under-studied. Following Scott (1989) and Wong (2001), this paper characterizes the riots into three phases. Phase one (May - June 1967) witnessed the political demonstrations and strikes by local leftists. Phase two (July - August 1967) was fuelled with bomb terrorism instigated by the leftists and I shall outline how the three groups of actors reacted to it. Phase three (from September 1967 onwards) was marked by the decline in political power of the radicals in China and I will show how this impacted the political actors in Hong Kong. I shall then revisit Ian Scott's seminal argument about the legitimacy crisis of Hong Kong. In the conclusion I will summarize the factors shaping the riots.

I. Phase One (May - June 1967) : From Violent Demonstrations to General Strikes

In a personal interview with Sir Jack Cater,¹ I was told that intelligence operations under the Police Special Branch had already noticed the infiltration of leftists into union organizations since the mid-1960s. Although intelligence from Macau had foreseen possible problems in Hong Kong, "there was no special preparation against a possible expansion of the Cultural Revolution into the territory even after the Macau incidents in 1966". Separate and minor labour clashes in spring 1967 were not initially viewed with alarm. As he said, "There was nothing happening in Hong Kong in early 1967".

A. The Establishment of the "Special Group"

The first hint of possible complications in Hong Kong came in April 1967 when the leftists created troubles on the streets in Kowloon. The Hong Kong government was quick to tackle the mobilizations. Jack Cater left his position as Secretary of Defence but formed a "Special Group" to handle the situations.² The Special Group was chaired by Cater himself, and the members included Denis Bray, Robert Locking, and David Ford.³ It also included representatives from the Police Special Branch and Radio Hong Kong (now Radio Television Hong Kong), and a specially delegated Assistant Secretary for Chinese Affairs. The group met every morning during the summer of 1967 to inform Governor David Trench of what happened the night before and received advice from him.⁴ Although the works of the Special Group were never publicized during the period and no reports were produced for the public, the Legislative Council regarded it as engaging heavily in informing and influencing public opinion against the leftist campaign of anti-government propaganda (Legislative Council 1968). Specific actions were then taken by regular agencies to satisfy public desires. For instance, the Transport Department reported frequently on the impact of the disturbances on vital transport operations. Radio Hong Kong increased special interest broadcasts, and Government Information Services issued daily information bulletin to explain the government's purposes. These worked to help explain government responses to the struggle campaign (Waldron 1976, 240).

Despite the determined actions to quell the riots, there was some initial hesitation to deal with the leftists. Jack Cater acknowledged that it was not an easy task to develop a policy dealing with the local leftists.⁵ The Hong Kong government at that time shared the confusion of the London administration in ascertaining China's intention on Hong Kong and to interpret China's "verbal support" of the local leftists (Waldron 1976, 235). In an interview with me, Denis Bray admitted that the government was at the beginning worried about intervention from Beijing.⁶ In fact, the government had planned for water rationing if China did not supply water as they had originally contracted to do so on 1 October. Arrangements were made to hire tankers and draw water from Japan and other places in Asia. There were also preparations for food rationing if China closed the border and blocked the supply of meat and vegetables to Hong Kong.⁷

After a few weeks of hesitation, however, the government became increasingly convinced that the violence originated largely from local grievances, and that China was unlikely to intervene directly. According to Sir Jack Cater,

I had contacted Beijing, and it was quite obvious that Beijing, especially Zhou Enlai, did not like the troubles made by the leftists in Hong Kong.⁸

It was therefore commonly agreed in the government that Beijing appeared uninterested in toppling or fettering Hong Kong at that time, and that the struggle campaign was only a distinctly local phenomenon (Waldron 1976, 236).

B. Maintaining Law and Order

In early May 1967, some leftists held their little red books and demonstrated in front of the Government House. The government tolerated them so long as they observed the law. However, violent demonstrations on 22 May directly effected the strengthening of government efforts in maintaining law and order. As Denis Bray argued,

We tried to emphasize that we were not suppressing any political movements. But we simply were concerned about law, order, and public security.⁹

When it was obvious that law and order were undermined, the only answer was to use batons and to make arrests and even to impose curfew (Cooper 1970, 31). But the government's summary dismissal of 1,651 strikers in government agencies (about 2.35 per cent of the civil servants) did force the followers of the struggle campaign to rethink seriously before taking any further steps that could jeopardize their future livelihood.¹⁰

The government was also trying to clamp down on any possibilities for further disturbances. The Kuomintang branch in Hong Kong once offered to bring their fighters onto the streets to attack the leftist rioters but was forestalled by the government, for fear that it might provoke intervention from China on a massive scale.¹¹ According to Jack Cater, the government "was trying in every possible way not to give any excuses for escalation, and to make sure not to create any incidents. However, the police needed to do something when they [the leftists] were breaking the law".¹² Indeed, the efforts of the Hong Kong police to maintain law and order were widely approved of. The Far Eastern Economic Review commented,

Their superb mixture of forbearance and firmness in putting down hooliganism should be praised. Their correct attitude has cost them a comparatively high toll of injuries to their own Force, but has kept civilian casualties to a minimum.¹³

C. The Masses¹⁴

Arguably, the refugee mentality of the Hong Kong people made them spectators in the initial stage of the riots. Hong Kong has long been regarded as the lifeboat and China the sea, "those who have climbed into the lifeboat naturally don't want to rock it" (Hoadley 1970, 211). Therefore, most of the refugee masses supported the policies of the colonial government in the riots. And if public opinion and the mass media represented the voice of the masses, they no doubt fully supported the colonial government too. English newspapers such as Star, Hong Kong Standard, and South China Morning Post generally approved of government policies and they appealed to the masses to settle disputes. The newspapers thus provided "a much-needed and encouraging services to both government and the mass" (Cooper 1970, 89).

On the other hand, the Chinese newspapers went to two extremes. The right-wing press was appalled at the riots and advised all loyal citizens to take no part in them. But the leftists saw the riots as "heroic acts" of the oppressed and continually urged their perpetration. Thus, whereas "the right-wing press rendered a considerable service to the government, the left-wing press held a dagger constantly at its throat" (Cooper 1970, 89).

Governor Trench, speaking at a conference at the Commonwealth Office on 29 June, 1967, claimed that "98 percent" of the general public supported the government to restore law and order (Scott 1989, 104). Most of them were passive supporters; they accepted and approved of what the government was doing without actually mentioning it (ibid., 97). Neither did they voice their objection to the leftists. They kept silence "because they were afraid that if Beijing really takes over Hong Kong, they would be in trouble".¹⁵

Others expressed themselves in written words. A considerable number of letters arrived in the mail bags of local papers agreeing with government policies and in many cases suggesting measures, often far more extreme than those being taken, to control the elements that were causing so much trouble. According to Denis Bray, the people in Hong Kong "suggested more than we [the government] did against the leftists because they were really frightened about the Communists. It was very terrible in China at that time. So, they were really frightened".¹⁶ M. K. Chan concurred,

The leftist campaign proved to be counter-productive. It severely delegitimized the PRC or CCP cause among the Hong Kong Chinese who broke their long patriotic tradition of supporting China's cause in Sino-British conflicts but instead stood firmly behind the Hong Kong government's counter-measures. The pain in alienated Hong Kong Chinese hearts and minds could hardly be estimated.¹⁷

By mid-May, 98 organizations pledged their support to the government (Appendix A).¹⁸ The Kaifong statements were the most salient example of public support. It has been acknowledged that Kaifong associations, as the largest single example of private social organizations in Hong Kong, expressed the most consolidated element of Hong Kong sentiment (Hu and Wong 1968-69, 42). The Kaifong leaders pledged themselves to influence the community to effect a speedy settlement of the labour disputes and an end of the riots.¹⁹ They spoke openly on radio or television in an effort to halt the riots, and this move was much welcomed by the government. In brief, when faced with a choice between the British authority in Hong Kong and the Cultural Revolution in China, the majority of the masses chose to side with the colonial government.

D. Hong Kong Elites²⁰

The Hong Kong University Students' Union (HKUSU), Heung Yee Kuk, and the elites previously critical of the government also turned out to be supporters of the colonial regime. No government can ever see its policies successfully carried out without the support of elites. Officials seeking support for the government find their tasks much easier if they have the approval of these influential social groups.

The Vice-Chancellor of the University of Hong Kong and the HKU Students' Union were the first to support the government at the early stage of the riots.²¹ Both insisted that only by supporting government policies could there evolve a peaceful atmosphere in which talks might be held (Cooper 1970, 99). When asked how the Hong Kong government influenced public opinions by mobilizing student groups, Jack Cater admitted:

I went to the University directly and asked for support. It is sure that people in Hong Kong University strongly supported the government and once the support began, hundreds and hundreds came to our side.²²

Indeed, local leftists had attempted to subvert the student body. A press campaign was launched to discredit student leaders, and anonymous letters were sent to large numbers of university students. The campaign was nonetheless inept. However, it has been argued that if local leftists did manage to capture the Student's Union, they would have had a first-class platform to embarrass the government and the University itself. Having the prestige as the spokesmen for young intellectuals, the leftists would also be in an advantageous position to appeal to the public in general (Goodstadt 1967).

Cater knew very well that "Hong Kong people did not really love the British more, but they loved the leftists and the radicals in the PRC less at that time". When asked how the government got the support from a total of 650 organizations in just a few months, he argued that "if they did not support us, the great problem would come when the Communists took over Hong Kong".²³ Apparently the support from the University stimulated other powerful organizations to declare their support for the government. Heung Yee Kuk was another important case.

On 25 May, 1967, Heung Yee Kuk, the advisory body on all matters affecting the New Territories, declared its full support and unreserved approval of government measures in maintaining order and stability in Hong Kong. Pang Fu-wah, then chairman of the Kuk, said patrols were essential to protect villages from the "Struggle Committees". The Kuk thought that such patrols would help maintain economic prosperity and keep food supplies moving. Associations all over the New Territories, including rural committees, chambers of commerce, and clan associations, also issued a joint statement affirming their position:

We jointly appeal to everybody in the New Territories to support Government in its firm stand to safeguard the well-being and peaceful life of the Hong Kong people and we are confident of the New Territories' people in this.²⁴

Representatives of the villagers in Southern Lantau Island also handed over a letter to the New Territories administration to convey their unreserved support for the government to maintain peace and order.²⁵ Thus, as most residents in the New Territories were united in the desire to wipe out the rioters, the governors and the governed developed greater mutual respect than ever before.

Pro-government sentiments also emerged from some previously critical elites in the society. Elsie Elliott, well known in Hong Kong for her outspoken views, broke a self-imposed silence on the riots and pleaded with the young people to keep away from the chaos and to respect peace.²⁶ A. de O. Sale, a lawyer in Hong Kong, also urged "everyone to back [the] government, and the latter to review its present policy of restraint, where not only property but life or limbs endangered" (Cooper 1970, 100).

II. Phase Two (July - August 1967): Sha Tau Kok Incidents and the Burning of the British Embassy in Beijing

A. Sha Tau Kok incidents

On 8 July, 1967, Chinese soldiers crossed the border and six to seven Hong Kong policemen were killed at Sha Tau Kok. The incident was "surprising" in the eyes of the Hong Kong government.²⁷ Although there were 5,000 British soldiers based in the New Territories, including a full battalion within the vicinity of Sha Tau Kok, they could not be immediately involved after the clashes, for two reasons. First, they had not undertaken a direct military role before. Second, their role at the frontier could possibly lead to direct confrontation and result in a major Sino-British conflict (Cooper 1970, 105). Consequently, the request for military assistance could not be fulfilled straightaway.

Jack Cater, head of the Special Group, agreed that the only way in which the policemen in Sha Tau Kok could be rescued was to use the troops. Eventually, he decided to send the Gurkhas to the border.²⁸ Troops were immediately deployed alongside the police. They met no resistance and finally arrived at the police post which was then under fire. With the presence of the Gurkhas, the area quieted down and no more shots were heard.

At the beginning, the Hong Kong government had been somewhat cautious about the clashes in Sha Tau Kok for fear of possible intervention from China.²⁹ Later, when Jack Cater contacted the central leadership in China it was quite clear that Zhou Enlai had not approved of the incidents in Sha Tau Kok. According to Cater,

Beijing told us to "hold on" and that they would help. But then they were also in chaos. There were also riots and most of the provinces in China had serious problems. They could not do anything for us at that time.³⁰

Zhou had said in a meeting that "as the struggle continued to escalate, it is really difficult to stop and we are already 'riding the tiger'" (Chen 1999, 355). This confirmed Cater's remarks. Therefore, the Hong Kong government could conclude that the Sha Tau Kok incidents, though serious, were not an attempt at armed invasion of the colony as no regular units of the PLA were involved. All these suggested that the incident was purely organized and executed locally by the Guangdong villagers in the immediate vicinity.

B. Burning of the British Embassy

The Arrest of the editors-in-chief of three Communists' newspapers in mid-August in Hong Kong and the banning of their publication gave the Yao Dengshan - Wang Li group³¹ in Beijing an excuse to escalate the case into a Sino-British diplomatic confrontation. On 20 August, Donald Hopson, then British Ambassador to China, was delivered an "ultimatum" by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to lift the ban on all publications within 48 hours, otherwise the British were to be answerable for the consequences.

To the British, it amounted to a demand for total surrender. Compliance or even partial compliance was out of the question. As Denis Bray said, "Even though they [Beijing] fired our embassy, we said no to them. We were very brave".³² Two days later, the Red Guards burnt down the British Embassy completely (Jin Yaoru 1998, 122). British staffs were reportedly beaten when they rushed out of the building. For instance, Percy Cradock, advisor to Donald Hopson, was being swept along by the mob and beaten at the shoulders and the back (Cradock 1994, 64).

The maltreatment of Hopson, and his consul in Shanghai, Peter Hewitt, would normally have become sufficient grounds for any foreign powers to break diplomatic ties with China. But the British government did not take that logical step, for several reasons. Most obviously, without any diplomatic relations, Hong Kong would have been placed in total jeopardy. Secondly, a break in relations might also result in leaving the staff in Beijing in Chinese hands, essentially depriving them of the remaining shreds of diplomatic protection. Most importantly, the British considered the burning of the embassy merely a result of the Red Guards taking over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that the storm would probably pass, as it did, soon enough. It was clear that the burning was triggered by extremists of the Red Guards such as Yao Dengshan and Wang Li, and not the central leaders like Zhou and Mao.

C. Terrorism in Hong Kong

Following the bloodshed in China, local leftists quickly launched bomb attacks in Hong Kong and they became political foe to the government. From the perspective of the government, the continued bomb terrorism was not only anti-government but it also endangered the lives of innocent bystanders.³³ Because of this, the government began to adopt a more vigorous anti-riot policy after 12 July — to eliminate the leftists' bases before any more violence or bombings could occur. It was done mainly by police raids empowered by emergency legislation.

Two factors, both external and internal, explained why the government was determined to adopt the offensive policy at that time. Externally, the Hong Kong government was quick to discern the weakness of the leftists, who were anticipating direct popular support and intervention from China but which apparently did not materialize.³⁴ The stationing of the PLA near the Hong Kong border to restrain popular demonstrations after the Sha Tau Kok incidents and the continued trans-border commercial and administrative contacts during the period basically confirmed this.³⁵

Moreover, as seen by the British, there was a great discrepancy between supportive statements issued in China on behalf of the Hong Kong struggle and the actual concrete aid or intervention from the Chinese side.³⁶ As an official in the British Foreign and Colonial Office argued,

Zhou Enlai has recently called for moderation of Communist tactics in the colony. It does seem likely that he, and others whose main concern is with the administration and economy of China, realize that the present extremist policies can only harm China and therefore try whenever possible to moderate their effects. If this is so, we must be particularly careful in our policy, both in Hong Kong and towards China itself, to act so as to encourage such moderating influences as exist and to provide the minimum amount of opportunities for the extremists to take the lead.³⁷

All these hinted that the struggle would eventually recede. It thus provided a basis for the Hong Kong government to implement offensive anti-riot measures from mid-July onwards.

Internally, the police in Hong Kong had acted with great restraint in the early phase of the riots. Various attacks by the rioters had been contained and they gained no ground in their struggle. It was argued that the strategies used by the police had earned them respect and endeared them to the general public. As attempts to control local leftists was reciprocated with violence, the masses and the government both agreed that sterner measures were necessary if the insidious rioters were to be kept in check. It became obvious that only deliberate action by the police could achieve the desired results. The activation of the emergency powers, followed by the "crack down" or "offensive" policy to maintain peace and order, therefore constituted the main tactic of the anti-riot policy of the government.

Consequently, David Irving Gass, the Colonial Secretary, announced in the Legislative Council that from 12 July onwards the government was determined to "grasp and maintain the initiative". He said,

We are convinced and determined now that the time has come to grasp and retain the initiative in this contest... and we have no doubt of the final outcome. Meanwhile it is time to be alert and resolute and steadfast.³⁸

Emergency provisions were enacted under Chapter 241 of the Hong Kong Ordinances. Action was taken under the long-standing Emergency Regulations Ordinance which allowed the government to deal with what was described as "a threat to the stability of the colony in the special circumstances prevailing".³⁹ Denis Bray argued,

We know there are plenty of weapons, including guns and bombs, in their [the leftists'] hands. They were very easily imported from China. We determined to go into their premises to look for the bombs.⁴⁰

Subsequently, strong parties of police, backed up by military units, raided the principal leftist strongholds, including union premises and schools. They seized stocks of homemade weapons and explosives as well as provocative posters and literature, and they took into custody a number of people suspected of subversive activities.⁴¹

The implementation of emergency powers gave the government and the police the authority to halt the riots and to arrest or detain rioters. The local leftists bore the brunt of this clean up activity. These raids were met with charges in the leftwing press that the government, unable to control the growing strength of the struggle, "merely used pretexts of misconduct to stage thinly-veiled physical attacks on fixtures and political decorations in leftist establishments" (Committee of Hong Kong Kowloon Chinese Compatriots of All Circles for the Struggle Against Persecution by the British Authorities in Hong Kong 1967, 38). In response to this, Denis Bray said,

It was very difficult to say that we only maintained the law and order since most people we caught were leftists. For example, the arrest of the publishers and the banning of the three newspapers, the Tin Fung Yat Po, the Hong Kong Evening News and the Afternoon News were not simply because they were leftwing press, but because they told people to plant bombs in the streets. They were acting the violence, and were much more extreme.⁴²

In a highly-congested urban environment, the police sought to discourage violent outbursts in the guise of conducting sanitary campaigns to confiscate offensive materials and to disrupt and isolate groups of possible anti-British political mobilization (Waldron 1970, 266). This finally led to the largest raid in the first few days of August, which was spectacular both in execution and in results. Over 1,000 members of the Hong Kong Police Force, assisted by army and military helicopters, were dispatched to North Point where a large stock of weapons and other suspicious materials were found in three different buildings. Some extraordinary discoveries were made. For instance, in a flat at Kiu Koon Mansion, an electrical circuit was wired to provide currents to a wire-meshed floor mat at the entrance to prevent the authorities from entering. A fully stocked clinic was brought to light and it was reported that a man carrying a booklet entitled "How to Make a Bomb" was detained.⁴³ Weapons uncovered in these raids alarmed the government and also prompted renewed public demands for government actions against violence.

D. The Masses

Indiscriminate bomb attacks and the government's efforts to protect the citizens further discredited the local leftists in the hearts and minds of the masses. The masses were particularly infuriated when two innocent children and a radio talk show host were killed.

The South China Morning Post described the 20 August incident as the most dastardly communist-inspired act to date. Two small children, Wong Yee-man and Wong Siu-fan, were killed in a bomb explosion in North Point. The Hong Kong Standard assailed the local leftists for provoking this incident, and the more extreme Tin Tin Daily News vehemently urged execution of those responsible for the killing. Even the leftist papers were somewhat shocked, delaying coverage of the incident or just offering brief remarks. Waldron argued that the relative silence of the leftists suggested that no matter how much the leftist press appeared to support the political struggle, they did not wish to assume direct responsibility for the confrontation (1976, 155).

The death of the two children not only provided the government a chance to pose as protector of the people, but it also made the rioters lose all their moral ground in the struggle. When Lam Bun was killed a few days later, they further alienated the majority of the masses.⁴⁴

Lam Bun, a 37 years-old popular radio talk show host who was noted for his fearless condemnation of the leftists, became a victim when unidentified persons poured gasoline on his automobile and set it afire on 24 August. His death became the focus of considerable public attention. Far from advancing the struggle cause, the murder of Lam Bun seemed to confirm a growing sentiment that the public was a pawn in an ill-conceived charade, especially when the local leftists boasted of this assault in contrast to its previous silence on the death of the two Wong's children.⁴⁵ Denis Bray observed,

The Lam Bun incident made a shock to most Hong Kong people. Hong Kong people were really frightened about the Communists coming in and so, it gave a chance for us to get the public support by protecting people.⁴⁶

E. The Hong Kong Elites

Unlike the masses who generally supported the government during the leftist terrorism, the elites were mainly split into three groups: the escapists, the optimists, and the opportunists.

As most of the business and social elites in the 1960s came to Hong Kong after World War II and especially after the establishment of the PRC in 1949, many of them could be seen as escapists. In 1967, when political turmoil took place in Hong Kong, it was understandable that they were very concerned about their status and wealth. Many of them decided to emigrate. One university student described the evacuation of Hong Kong in the following way,

In times of crisis, the elites and leaders would leave behind immediately if a change in the status of Hong Kong occurred. The first to leave would be the senior officials followed by the order ranks and grades of European, with the police and revenue inspectors in the rear. The taipans, using their own transport and with money salted away, would have left long before also (Lethbridge 1968).

Governor David Trench was also on leave in July. Although the government argued that he took his leave as usual since nothing serious happened in Hong Kong, the wealthy businessmen and professionals did not believe in such claims. Instead, they believed that the Governor had already lost confidence in ruling Hong Kong. Their view was confirmed by the Foreign and Colonial Office.

Sir David Trench ... was in a poor state of health following a very painful sinus operation and he appeared to have some doubts whether we could continue to hold on in Hong Kong under the mounting Chinese pressure.⁴⁷

Because of this, some of them decided to "escape" from Hong Kong in the name of going on holidays or doing business.⁴⁸ For example, a number of Chinese millionaires moved to Vancouver where they intended to start their manufacturing enterprises. Applications for immigration visas from the professional class were received at the rate of about 1,500 a month. The immigration department of British Columbia said that it required ten times its normal staff to cope with the rush.⁴⁹ In comparing this with the exodus of Hong Kong people in the 1990s, Denis Bray commented, "It is not like the 1997 problem since there is a long period to leave. But people left in a short period of time in 1967".⁵⁰ Apparently, the escapists voted with their feet as they were getting anxious about the turbulent situation in Hong Kong.

Others, however, still regarded the colony as the best place for investment and they perceived the colonial government as a protector of the people. Many public figures tried to reassure that Hong Kong was indeed functioning normally. For instance, R.G.L. Oliphant, Executive Director of the Trade Development Council, claimed in an interview that,

The riots did not cause any substantial disruption of trade or scare off any potential investors in Hong Kong. The whole economy continued to function virtually as normal during the riots. Absenteeism was never a problem because by and large people went lost in all sectors of industry because of the curfew.⁵¹

Michael Montague, Chairman of the British National Export Council's Asia Committee, also said, "The current Communist-engineered disturbances were only having a temporary 'alarmist' effect on Hong Kong".⁵² Chinese industrialists lent their support too. An owner of two small factories making umbrella parts asserted that he was doubtful about Hong Kong's future, "but for the moment it still seems to be the best place for making money".⁵³ People such as Li Ka-shing who stayed in Hong Kong during the riots earned a huge profit when the property price boomed after several years. To some, this was a "gift" for having confidence in Hong Kong.⁵⁴

But there was also a group of well-educated people supportive of the "struggle against the British imperialists". They were hoping to capture political power if local leftists overthrew the colonial regime. Goodstadt (1967a) interviewed a member of the Struggle Committee, Chung, who belonged to the professional class, and he explained why he supported the riots. As a long time resident in Hong Kong, he claimed that he was the victim of overt and insulting racism. To him, the Hong Kong community was solely concerned with its own self-interests and he considered this the fault of the colonial government and a system of "slave education". His major complaint was against the government's expenditure because it "milked the public for British benefits".⁵⁵ Chung was happy about the bomb attacks. He even admitted that he "[did] not care how many people are killed and wounded. Violence is the only thing that will work".

The leftist also found their support in Kwok, a staff member in the Tram Company. Goodstadt (1967b) described him as well-educated and a fluent talker who had never been in trouble with the police. Kwok reasoned that "If the Communists do come here, the British would offer me no protection, they would not take me to London so it is wiser to follow the Communist way at present." It thus appears that he supported the communist cause and went on strike for the sole purpose of getting a clean record if Hong Kong was ever returned to China. Apparently, these members of the elite class were dissatisfied with the government and were hoping to harvest political gains if the leftists succeeded in their anti-imperialist struggle.

Thus, judging from their responses during the riots the elites could be classified into three types: (1) the escapists who were very alarmed at the chaotic situation and chose to leave Hong Kong; (2) the optimists who were cautious about Hong Kong's future but nevertheless regarded it as the best place for investment; and (3) the opportunists who were envisaging political benefits should the leftists succeed in overthrowing the government.

III. Phase Three (since September 1967): Back to Normal

The Hong Kong government, becoming aware of the relative dominance of moderate Communists in Beijing, adopted a more hard-line attitude towards local leftists, including the New China News Agency (NCNA). In spring 1968, the NCNA made a request to Governor Trench and Sir Jack Cater to discuss issues of the "struggle" and to restore the stability of Hong Kong (Jin 1998, 149-52), but the governor gave it the cold-shoulder.

We knew earlier that the local Communists' campaign had been haphazard and misdirected; and there was a good deal of evidence that they had been dissatisfied with the amount of assistance they received from across the border. It was clear that they steadily lost support. Now, their "struggle" has little effects on the daily life of the Colony...⁵⁶

Do we really need to talk? Is there anything we need to discuss? I do not think so (quoted in Jin 1998, 152).

Towards the end of 1967, with the Governor's blessing a stern policy towards the local leftists was implemented to restore normal conditions.⁵⁷ Given the gradual resumption of political order, the government began to turn its eyes to the economy. Governor Trench said,

At present the principal threat to the Colony appears to be the risk of long-term economic stagnation caused by reluctance to invest. If the policy of reviving trade with Hong Kong is pursued, it will become more difficult subsequently for the Communists to revert to the aim of making the Colony an "economic desert", and to encourage terrorist activities that might have the same effect.⁵⁸

The government thus appeared to slide back into its customary complacency since the decline of demonstrations no longer made social reforms so critical (Waldron 1976, 287). However, in the wider society, both the masses and the elites began to advocate reforms.

Popular support for the government hinged on the people's belief that they had a lot to lose if the leftists were to win. It was therefore crucial for the masses to feel that they were getting their fair share of the fruits of economic growth and that the government was taking adequate measures to meet their aspirations for better living conditions and wider educational opportunities for their children. After the riots were over, it was commonly agreed that the government should launch a social programme that could change the image of the Hong Kong government and to improve its governance in the long term.

For instance, at the end of 1967, the United Nations Association in Hong Kong asked the Hong Kong government "to produce a happy and law abiding population, amenable to reason, self-respecting, and self disciplined". It demanded the government to institute the following programme forthwith:

1.	Compulsory free education.
2.	Civil rights for residents of Hong Kong be equal to those enjoyed by the residents of the United Kingdom, in particular freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration.
3.	Protection against uncompensated rises in the cost of living.
4.	More and better social welfare provisions.
5.	More and better medical care.
6.	More and better housing.
7.	Equal facilities to travel and enter neighbouring and other countries.
8.	Protection against governmental, commercial and industrial exploitation.59

A letter to the "Reader's Mail" section of China Mail in 1968 also raised serious doubts about the government. A reader, writing under the pseudonym "Awake", questioned if the government really knew what the vast majority of the people in Hong Kong were thinking about and he queried if the Governor got full, proper, and genuine information from his advisers. He further criticized the government for not investigating the feelings of the general population. In his words, "It is useless asking what the populace wants the government to do. Someone in Choi Hung Estate who has a very sick wife would want more hospitals. Another who has five children but only one attends school because he could not afford the fees for the others would want help in that regard".⁶⁰ In effect, most Hong Kong people did not believe that the government could share their feelings, and that it did not know what the majority of the people needed.

The elites also joined the masses in criticizing the colonial government for not doing enough. Brook Bernacchi, Urban Councillor and Chairman of the Reform Club, warned:

More riots "a repeat performance of 1967" will happen as a result of the government's broken promises. But the people will not rally round next time. In 1967 a whole lot of people elected to back the government because they had come to Hong Kong on their feet. But the Hong Kong-born younger generation living in an atmosphere of frustration will be in the saddle by the time of the next crisis. They will not back the government.⁶¹

Bernacchi therefore suggested that the government should spend more than just one percent of its total budget on the Social Welfare Department, provide free compulsory education for pupils up to 14 years of age, and develop new towns with complete communal facilities. The principal welfare officer in charge of the youth welfare section of the Social Welfare Department also agreed that more should be spent on youth,

Youngsters are an integral part of our society. We must help them towards a greater awareness of their role. We must assist them on the road to social maturity and the acceptance of their future responsibilities. The government this year [1967-68] give $3.8 million to help pay for youth services. We are fully conscious of the pressures on the younger generation.⁶²

On the other hand, Elsie Elliot, another Urban Councillor, called for reform in the area of labour, since, as she said, the undesirable industrial conditions which motivated the riots still existed.⁶³ But despite the fact that the elites also made strong demands on reforms, they were not perceived as sharing the same line with the masses. In fact, the masses even criticized what the elites had done during the riots. A letter to Tin Tin Daily News reads:

Have the Urban Councillors forgotten who they are or have they undertaken to act as defense counsels for the riots? During the riots, the elected Councillors seldom spoke on behalf and in the interests of the public. Whenever they came to problems pertaining to the present situation, the Councillors just advocated something impractical and irrelevant with the situation. ... Such elected Councillors were very disappointing indeed because they had failed in their mission entrusted them by the electors.⁶⁴

Elected Councillors were therefore seen as hypocrites. This abhorrence of the elites was echoed by "Awake", who accused the government of focusing only on the interests of the elites. He asked,

Which Hong Kong was the government talking about? The one bounded by Causeway Bay, Tai Hang Road, Conduit Road and Victoria Street in the south to Jordan Road, Gascoigne Road, Chatham Road and Hung Hom reclamation in the north? Or do they mean Shamsuipo, Shekkipmei, Wongtaisin, Choi Hung and Kuntong [Kwun Tong] where nearly half the colony's population is located?⁶⁵

In short, during the final stage of the riots both the masses and the elites demanded social reforms in the areas of labour conditions, youth, and education policies. But the masses perceived the government as having bias in favour of the elites. In order to pre-empt potential social and political disturbance, the colonial administration had to take prompt action to strengthen its governance in the long run.

IV. Revisiting Ian Scott: The Myth of the "Legitimacy Crisis"

Ian Scott has argued that the 1967 riots represented a crisis of legitimacy to the Hong Kong government. A crisis of legitimacy occurs when a significant proportion of the governed or powerful political groups necessary to the maintenance of the system withdraw their consent or acquiescence to government actions (1989, 322). If we define crisis in this way, then the concept of legitimacy crisis does not seem appropriate to explain the 1967 riots, which were not really a crisis to the government of Hong Kong but just a "test" or a "questioning" of legitimacy.⁶⁶ There are several reasons for this alternative argument.

First, Scott's explanation of crisis contradicts his acknowledgement that most of the Hong Kong people supported the colonial government at that time. For Scott, the riots in 1967 represented a crisis of legitimacy in the sense that a significant proportion of the governed withdrew their consent to government action (Scott 1989, 322). If the masses represent a "significant proportion of the governed" in Hong Kong, it is crystal clear that most of them did actually support the government rather than the rioters or the authority in Beijing. As Norman Miners argued:

The 1967 confrontation was largely a spillover from the excesses of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China; it ended as soon as stable conditions had been restored in Canton and Peking and while it was in progress the Communist instigators received little spontaneous support from most of the population (Miners 1975, 30).

Scott himself echoed this argument. He mentioned that "faced with a choice between communism of the Cultural Revolution variety and the unreformed colonial capitalist state, most people chose to side with the devil they knew" (Scott 1989, 104). It is clear that the devil chosen by the people in Hong Kong was the colonial government, despite the fact that its performance was not very satisfactory. It is thus self-contradictory for Scott to argue on the one hand that the 1967 riots were a crisis while on the other to admit that a large portion of the people sided with the government.

Second, there is also no evidence to support the claim that the elites in Hong Kong also "withdrew their consent to the government". According to Scott, another condition of a legitimacy crisis is that "powerful political groups necessary to the maintenance of the system withdraw their consent to the government" (1989, 322). If the groups Scott referred to were the elites, the 1967 riots were by no means a crisis. Most, if not all, of the Hong Kong elites, even the members of the Reform Club, chose the side of the government.

In the final analysis, arguably, the British officials in Hong Kong and the police did not perceive of a "crisis". In particular, Sir David Akers-Jones rejected the use of the term "crisis" to describe the 1967 riots:

A "crisis" is only a word used by the social scientists. It is not a very accurate description for the actual situation in 1967. I don't think we had a legitimacy crisis at that time.⁶⁷

Echoing Akers-Jones, Cater said, "I think Professor Ian Scott was just talking nonsense for the crisis of legitimacy".⁶⁸ A Chinese police constable also argued,

If you think the living condition in Hong Kong was poor in the 1960s, then most countries in the East Asia, except Japan, were much poorer. As I knew, the employment rate in Hong Kong was very high at that time, especially in the manufacturing sector. We [Hong Kong people] were all living happily in this British colony. The Hong Kong government was not an "absolute king". There was no need for the Hong Kong people to "overthrow" the government. Therefore, I do not think the riots constituted a crisis.⁶⁹

In fact, the 1967 riots represented a "test" or a "question" of legitimacy, rather than an actual crisis for the Hong Kong government. "Test" can be defined as "an examination or a trial" of the legitimacy and effective governance of the Hong Kong government. It can also be understood as the "action that the government must take in order to indicate how well they are able to rule". "Questioning" can be defined as "raising a doubt or uncertainty on the legitimacy of the government at that time". Apparently these fit more the mentality of the British officials in Hong Kong at that time. Denis Bray argued,

I don't think there is a crisis of legitimacy in the 1967 riots. Instead, the riots just represented a question or a test to us [Hong Kong government]. And most importantly, the answer we find from the Hong Kong people is they chose our side rather than the Cultural Revolution in China.⁷⁰

In short, the Hong Kong government passed the "test" and answered the "question" of legitimacy. The 1967 riots actually confirmed that the Hong Kong government was perceived as legitimate by most, if not all, of the Hong Kong people. Scott has also pointed out that "the end result of the disturbance was to increase the support for, and the legitimacy of, the existing order" (1989, 104). Seeing from this, it is hardly justified to describe the riots as a "crisis".

It seems that Scott's perspective on the concept of legitimacy was premised on "the procedure and moral basis". Samuel Huntington has differentiated the concept of legitimacy into two types: performance and procedure legitimacy (1991, 50). "Legitimacy based on performance" means that the government's legitimacy usually depends on the extent to which it meets the expectations of the masses such as economic growth, that is, their performance. However, what Scott focused on is another type of legitimacy - "procedure legitimacy" - which, according to Huntington, is based on the ability of voters to choose their rulers through elections. As Scott argued, "Legitimacy is not solely about capacity. It is also about the moral basis of authority" (1989, 327). However, the legitimacy of the colonial administration cannot be justified in procedure or moral terms. In the early period of the colonial era, the legitimacy of the Hong Kong government was arguably based on nothing other than coercion. Successive governors were mainly supported by contingents of armed forces. But later, the colonial government was also aware of the need to perform well in order to win the hearts and minds of the people. In short, seeing themselves as embodiments of "benign authoritarianism", the British officials shared exactly the perspective of Huntington's "legitimacy by performance." Because of this, the people of Hong Kong generally accepted the colonial administration without great difficulty.

V. Conclusion: Explaining the riots

This manuscript contributes to our understanding of the 1967 riots by combining a historical perspective with the internal dynamics of the Hong Kong government, the masses, and the elites. The 1967 riots could be divided into three phases: (1) political mobilization from May to June, (2) radical dominance in the PRC and terrorism in Hong Kong from July to August, and (3) back to the normality from September 1967 onwards. Different phases in the period witnessed different orientations of the political actors (Table 1). First, the Hong Kong government took varying measures to deal with the riots, aiming at restoring law and order from time to time. Second, alienated by the riots, the masses transformed themselves from political spectators to supporters of long-term reforms implemented by the colonial government. Lastly, the position of the elites diversified in the second phase when the radicals got power in the PRC, but towards the end of the riots they became supporters of reforms again. A thorough understanding of the riots would therefore need to take into consideration the internal dynamics of all these actors.

Table 1:
Different Responses of the Political Actors to the 1967 Riots

APPENDIX A:
The List of Declarations Supporting the Hong Kong Government

(The first 100 organizations in mid-May 1967)

1. The Federation of Hong Kong Industries
2. Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce
3. The Indian Chamber of Commerce
4. The Chinese Manufactures Association
5. The Hong Kong Buddhist Association
6. The Hong Kong Dental Society
7. The Hong Kong Reform Club
8. Hung Hom Kaifong Association
9. Tai Hang Kaifong Association
10. Hong Kong & Kowloon Kaifong Joint Research Council
11. Mongkok Kaifong Association
12. Kowloon City Kaifong Association
13. Central District Kaifong Association
14. Yau Ma Tei Kaifong Association
15. Mt. Davis R/E Kaifong Association
16. Kennedy Town Kaifong Association
17. Youth Campaign, H.K. & Kln. Kaifong Women Sec.
18. Wong Tai Sin Kaifong Association
19. San Po Kong Kaifong Association
20. Tai Hom Village Kaifong Association
21. Yuen Ling Kaifong Association
22. Ngau Tau Kok Kaifong Association
23. North Point Kaifong Association
24. Shaukiwan Kaifong Association
25. Causeway Bay Kaifong Association
26. Sokunpo Kaifong Association
27. Aberdeen Kaifong Association
28. Sham Shui Po Kaifong Association
29. Stanley Kaifong Association
30. Happy Valley and Canal Road District Kaifong Association
31. Aplichau Kaifong Association
32. Western District Kaifong Association
33. Tsim Sha Tsui Kaifong Association
34. Tsz Wan Shan Kaifong Association
35. Tai Hang Sai Resettlement Kaifong Association
36. King's Park Resettlement Kaifong Association
37. Cheung Sha Wan Kaifong Association
38. Lai Chi Kok Kaifong Association
39. Cha Kwo Ling Village Kaifong Association
40. The Hong Kong Civic Association
41. The Hong Kong Democratic Self-Govt. Party
42. Tung Wah Hospital
43. Po Leung Kuk
44. The Hong Kong Exporters' Association
45. Chung Sing Benevolent Society
46. Lok Sin Tong
47. Po Yick Commercial Association
48. Chinese Herbalists Association
49. Hong Kong Trade Development Council
50. Ho Man Tin Resettlement Kaifong Association
51. Wanchai Kaifong Association
52. Kowloon Chamber of Commerce
53. Hong Kong Eastern District Licensed Hawkers Association
54. Tai Po Rural Committee
55. Hong Kong Football Association
56. Hong Kong Residents' Association
57. Tung Hing Mansion Owners & Tenants Association
58. Kwok Fan-yeung Tong Clansmen Association
59. United Nations Association of Hong Kong
60. Landlord & Tenants Association of Tak Tung Mansion
61. Joint Kowloon Multi-storey Building Association
62. Hong Kong Council of Social Services
63. South Chinese Paper Merchants Association
64. Shaukiwan Chamber of Commerce
65. New Territories Tourists Association
66. H.K. Private Anglo-Chinese Schools Association
67. H.K. & Kowloon Private Chinese Schools Association
68. The Federation of H.K. Cotton Weavers
69. Hong Kong Cotton made-up Goods Manufacturers' Asso. Ltd.
70. Hong Kong Garment Manufacturers' Association
71. The Research of Hong Kong Garment Manufacturers'
72. The Hong Kong Cotton Weaving Manufacturers' Association
73. Women's Welfare Club-West
74. Tung Ching Association
75. Kowloon Licensed Hawkers Association
76. Sun Hing District Association
77. Hong Kong Pawn Shops Association
78. Fung Clansmen Association
79. Hopei & Shantung Natives Association
80. Yun Ping District Association
81. Hoi Au District Association
82. Social Welfare Advisory Committee
83. Ho Clansmen Association
84. H.K. Hok Shan Association
85. Lai Clansmen Association
86. Tung Koon District, Association
87. Eng Clansmen Association
88. Western District Licensed Hawkers Mutual-assistance Society
89. Wai Chow Clansmen General Association of H.K.
90. Eastern District Hawkers Society
91. Vilot Mansion Owners & Tenants Association
92. Hong Kong Teachers Association
93. Hong Kong & Kowloon Clansmen Gen. Association
94. Kowloon Learner-Drivers Tutor Association
95. Hong Kong Chinese Medical Association
96. The Hong Kong Christian Council
97. Federation of Hong Kong Students
98. Hong Kong University Students' Union
99. Tam's Clansmen Association
100. Association of Natives of Ngoi Hoi Village, Sun Wui

Source: Public Record Office, Hong Kong.