Chapter V: Constraints on a Free Job Market in China's
Political Economy
Summary: How do systemic elements influence the job
search and job selection process for Shenzhen
University students? To what extent do these
elements cause students to incorporate guanxi in the
job hunt? This chapter identifies several
impediments to a free labour market--one in which
employers and job-seekers negotiate employment based
on their own innate qualities. In large part these
constraints have prevented Shenzhen from quickly
adopting the ideal of a Western-style system where
information flows freely and jobs are obtained based
on merit and competition--an ideal that many
educationalists as well as the authors of state
documents aspire to. The market inefficiencies
discussed in this chapter have their roots in both
Chinese tradition and socialist planning. They
include: household registration, cadre status,
personal file maintenance, state-controlled housing
distribution, and a restrictive information system
and impediments to intra-regional labour flows.
This chapter discusses how changing national policy as
manifested through various operating systems affects the
students' job search. As China modernizes it is
undergoing various structural changes, with more to be
expected in the future.1 The residency requirement
(hukou), the personal file (dang'an), regional hiring
practices, and the creation of labour marketplaces are
all affected by changing policies.
Information on Jobs
Most basic economics courses--including the ones taught
at szu--explain that markets are imperfect and that they
deviate from the theoretical model for several reasons,
one of the most important being that buyers and sellers
are not always privy to complete information. In the
job search, of course, information flow is essential. In
the West, employment agencies, headhunters, and want
advertisements all enhance the flow. On the surface a
similar situation exists in Shenzhen, where the Shenzhen
Labour Bureau serves as a public employment market.
Private employment firms and headhunters do not appear to
exist. Several local newspapers carry advertisements
although these are few in number (and according to
respondents helped less than 5% of the 1993 graduates and
3.3% of the 1994 graduates find their jobs). Most
information on jobs comes by word-of-mouth, a point
further explored in the earlier section on social ties.
Usually, one learns something about a job before
landing it. Actually, as odd as it may seem to a
Westerner, this is usually not the case in China. In
fact, under fenpei, the new recruit was probably the last
to learn of the job to which s/he would be assigned. As
discussed in Chapter II, the process was initiated when
manpower planners established quotas, then lower level
bureaux refined the quotas, schools provided lists of
possible candidates, workunits were told whom they got,
and finally the assignee was told where and when to
report. This complicated process often involved
negotiation, in which the student was usually not
included, unless s/he had the right connections. To be
sure, there were abuses of the system2, but the extent of
corruption may only be surmised.
With the arrival of market reform, the job search in
China now excludes some former participants--
administrators involved in the allocation procedures at
various levels. Manpower planners and bureaucrats are no
longer initiators of plans. They have little to do
besides "signing off" on specific employment arrangements
agreed to by graduates and workunits, with some
assistance by university job placement officers. The
system starts to resemble the Western model. Students
hunt for information about jobs, search out informal
leads provided by friends, send out resums, and go for
interviews. All these steps require information. Some
information is formalized: labour bureaux list jobs
available, recruiters on campus generally have an open
"first call," newspapers carry advertisements. Much
information is informalized. For example, Ms. Zhou tells
Mr. Wang she knows a company that has a vacancy, and Wang
tries to make an appointment with the personnel office.
Yet, a third procedure exists. Here, information does
not deal with job openings, but rather it concerns
influential company employees, often managers, who can
make hiring decisions. In this case, Zhou tells Wang
that she knows a Mr. X in ABC company. Zhou introduces
Wang to Mr. X, who assesses him informally, often over a
meal. Mr. X also assesses his relationship with Zhou and
this relationship plays an important role in X's decision
on whether he hires Wang.
The 1993 szu graduates' survey data show a
significant relationship (Chisq = 93.2, p<.001) between
the use of guanxi and the way respondents found jobs (See
Table 5.1). For those who were introduced to their jobs,
there was a direct association with the use of guanxi
(See Table 5.2). An earlier discussion focused on how
people build guanxi. By the time of the job search,
students have either "pulled" sufficient guanxi or they
have not. But does this statistical relationship suggest
cause? Does the mere possession (as opposed to use,
which was asked for in the questionnaire) of guanxi
require a student to use a particular channel to find a
job? Or does the channel chosen determine whether guanxi
is used? Actually, the open channels, namely public
advertisements and campus recruitment, generally do not
require guanxi. The other channels, using introductions
and the self-directed search, may require guanxi. Then
again, guanxi may not be required. Generally, however,
one chooses a job search method and then determines
whether guanxi is needed. When students begin a job
search, they know whether they have sufficient guanxi.
At that point they may choose to use it. In that guanxi
is usually focused on a particular individual and thus
person-dependent (few students have general guanxi unless
they are a member of an important political household,
e.g., Deng Xiaoping's great-nephew), it often directs the
type of search one makes. Some students have guanxi but
choose not to use it at that time, preferring to find a
job on their own. This phenomenon of "delaying guanxi"
is most prevalent among graduates who change jobs.
The survey data of 1993 graduates also show that an
opposite association exists for those who used campus
recruitment or found their jobs through public
advertisements. For people who reported that they found
their jobs by themselves, there is a fairly normal
distribution according to use of guanxi. All this
strongly suggests that being introduced to a job
translates as using guanxi. There is also an interesting
relationship between job search method and whether the
employer reviewed the applicant's academic record. As
one would expect, those who found their jobs with an
introduction reported that their transcripts were
reviewed less often than those who used public
advertising or campus recruitment (see Table 5.2).
Those who found jobs by themselves had vitae
assessed less often than those who were introduced to the
jobs. There are at least two possible explanations for
this finding. First, the connection who is considering
hiring the student may want to make sure that the
applicant at least meets minimal requirements. In other
words, introduced students are not hired automatically.
The examination might be cursory, but an examination
occurs, nonetheless. Second, some of those who report
that they find jobs by themselves are also introduced.
This is a problematic category. Some who found jobs by
themselves with the help of an introduction may have
marked "found job by self" rather than "introduced to
job" on the questionnaire.
To conclude this section, information flow in
Shenzhen came through personal, not impersonal,
procedures. Newspapers carried few classified
advertisements. The labour market (here used literally,
as in marketplace) offered few jobs that students are
eligible for. Employers whom I interviewed deemed fresh
university graduates students to be inexperienced
(managerial experience required), overqualified (for
factory and construction jobs), or unskilled (don't have
a drivers' license). By 1995 campus recruitment involved
no more than several dozen firms, mostly banks, and
recruitment was often targeted to specific departments so
that qualified students from other departments were not
permitted to apply for the job. The best way to find out
about a job was through personal contacts.
Residence control (Hukou)
In Shenzhen, or anywhere else for that matter, all job
seekers are not created equal. Residing in the sez gives
special advantages, especially in that locals have a
familiarity with the zone and are more knowledgeable than
outsiders about where and how to look for jobs. The
guanxiwang that helps one find a job is more easily
cultivated when one's family resides in the area where
the job is being sought. These are advantages that cross
political and economic models and, as such, should not be
expected to differ by regions and cultures; in other
words, Sydneysiders have a headstart in finding jobs in
Sydney, and Shanghai residents can find jobs easier in
their hometown than can Beijing residents who job hunt in
Shanghai. On top of this natural bias in favour of local
job-hunters comes a particularly Chinese attribute:
residency permits (hukou).
Residency controls in China have exited for
centuries and have secured a well-entrenched niche in the
country's socialist system.3 In the 1950s, the Chinese
state implemented a policy to restrict urbanization by
controlling the flow of peasants to cities.4 The
mechanisms of this policy consisted of the residency
permit (hukou), food coupons, and the housing welfare
benefits provided by a person's workunit (danwei).
Although these forms of control have existed almost from
the beginning of the prc, their importance, especially as
measured by migration flows, has varied over time. In a
study of Shanghai, for example, Lynn White shows that
"[r]esidence control was so weakened by the breakdown of
the household system--and by the abundant harvests of
1958--that immigration to Shanghai was nearly
unrestricted during the Great Leap period."5 The policy
for Shanghai reflected the fact that command policies
were not as monolithic as they appeared from a reading of
public documents. They were greatly influenced by
political and economic determinants. In addition,
rigidity in policy, it may be generally argued,
encourages those who effect the implementation to develop
creative strategies in order to bring a degree of
flexibility to the policy.
Anywhere from one-third to two-thirds of people who
live in Shenzhen have only temporary residence--a group
that largely includes construction and factory workers.6
These temporary residents have temporary hukou which,
according to a Shenzhen factory owner from Taiwan who
runs three toy factories, cost the employer 100 annually
per worker.7 However, most university graduates who
remain in the sez will find ways to transfer their hukou,
a procedure denied blue collar workers.
The survey data on the 1993 szu graduates found that
87% of those working at the time of graduation took jobs
in the sez. At the time of their enrolment, the class
was evenly split--half lived inside the sez, half outside
in other areas in Guangdong. (By the time they
graduated, however, the parents of 58% lived in the sez,
which indicates a 16% in-migration.) What is the
relationship between original home (as measured by where
the student went to high school) and newly-acquired
workplace? Only 1.3% of graduates whose homes are in the
sez worked outside the sez. Yet, 29.8% of those whose
families live outside the sez took jobs in Shenzhen.
Indeed, home location had a significant impact on where
one works (Table 5.3)
Certainly some graduates choose to return to their
hometown, but in many cases the decision is not
voluntary. Job-hunters face the realization that some
local employers do not want to hire graduates who do not
have a local hukou. This was the case with two students
from Guangzhou and Shaoguan whose situations were further
complicated by the fact that one was a fee-paying student
and the other on a special political scholarship. They
were less entitled to remain in the sez than classmates
who were included in the state plan (Cases 34, 20).8 All
students, in fact, have their hukou transferred to the
university for the duration of estudy. They are supposed
to move the hukou out of the university within six months
of graduation. If their parents do not reside in
Shenzhen, students find other options. Several of the
graduates interviewed found private residences to
establish their hukou. One graduate, originally from
Guangzhou, kept his at the university, which charged 10
per month for the service (Case 7). Others, kept theirs
in the private residences of friends (Cases 28, 21). If
they had asked, their state companies would have given
them what is known as a collective hukou, and any later
dealings with the hukou would be handled through the
company. One respondent, however, termed this
"inconvenient," and did not relish dealing with company
bureaucrats in hukou matters (Case 28). Thus, he and
others obtained the permission of a friend or a friend of
the family to have their hukou assigned to the friend's
residence. The fact they do not live at this residence
may violate the spirit of the regulations, but it is not
a matter that concerns anyone I interviewed. Finding a
home for one's hukou was reported as a commonplace
occurrence that required little guanxi and no bribes or
requisite gift-giving.
The situation in Shenzhen, as described above, may
differ from what happens elsewhere in China where moving
the hukou is still quite difficult. Nevertheless, it is
similar to other places in that employees find it
necessary to invent ways to get around the problem.
Yang9 reports an informal market for trading hukou among
workers in Beijing. More recently, as White suggests,
intervening municipal agencies may be able to assist in
the legal transfer of rural workers' hukou, contravening
legal documentation.10 The system has more flexibility
than documents suggest.
The power of the hukou in restricting options for
college graduates elsewhere in China may also differ from
the Shenzhen case. Sending one's hukou back to the
hometown is a means often suggested for enforcing job
placement regulations or disciplining wayward students.11
From time to time, market economists and educators
suggest the hukou will eventually be discarded
altogether.12 In 1985, Qinghua and Shanghai Jiaotong
graduates came under an experiment in which they could
work in any of ten outlying areas and their hukou would
still be transferred to where their family lived.13 This
experiment was never broadened into a national program,
perhaps because so few students were (and are) willing to
work in outlying areas. Or those who are willing to work
in remote areas agree to move there and are not concerned
about loss of urban hukou.
Several students I met during a Shanghai job fair
reported how difficult it was to find a job in
Shanghai.14 If they could not find a job, their hukou
would revert to their native place, a policy confirmed in
the Jiaotong University regulations.15 This was a
constant fear among the job-hunters. Educators16 comment
on this "regional protectionism" and the consequent
immobility --a "syndrome in which graduates from colleges
or universities within the department or region are
assigned better jobs than graduates from colleges and
universities outside the region or department..."17
The flexibility and inventiveness used by szu
graduates in solving their hukou worries, of course, are
not needed when state companies are willing to hire them
and process their hukou. Many szu graduates hailing from
Guangdong work for state companies in Shenzhen (Cases 7,
9, 19, 14). Others, at foreign-capitalized companies or
banks, also settle the hukou problem, thus clearing the
way for them to work for Shenzhen employers (Case 5).
The importance of the hukou is diminishing elsewhere in
China, also. Students who work for joint ventures in
Fuzhou are reported to be disinterested in hukou.18 Two-
way choice has produced a new way of thinking, a new
attitude called si bu yao, or "the four don't wants":
I don't want hukou. I don't want food coupons (yu
liang guanxi). I don't want dang'an. I don't want
organizational relations (zu zhi guanxi).19
Interestingly enough, in 1986, seven years before the
above comments were printed, an SEC memo commented on
this attitude in a quite opposite, negative way,20 and
this drift was repeated in at least one education journal
article.21 The SEC memo accused workunits of "cutting
in" and grabbing the best students before they could be
formally assigned to a workunit. In order to get the
best students before they were lost in the allocation
process, these employers were declaring their five `no
needs': Students need not provide hukou, dang'an,
reporting letter (baodaozheng) that normally comes from
the municipal government, food subsidies, or relations
that are part of a workunit. These companies, who in
1986 were deemed to violate the allocation scheme, were
being in 1993 viewed positively as fierce competitors,
willing to go after the best students, throwing paperwork
to the wind. Indeed, times had changed.
Dossier (Dang'an)
This section concerns geographic controls that are
vestiges of China's half century experiment with
communism. An article from a Hong Kong paper that
described a Muslim school teacher's protest on a Beijing
street illustrates the problem.22 The teacher wanted to
move to Beijing because he could not find a wife in his
village:
His poster said he could not pay the 13,000 yuan (HK
11,778) required to have his personal file
transferred from the education bureau in the
outlying village of Fangshan to Beijing. The poster
said people with money and connections to people in
power have no problems getting their files
transferred, and argued it was unfair that others
had to pay fees to leave their jobs.
Whereas the hukou obstacle was usually easily hurdled by
szu graduates who wish to work in the sez, the dang'an
posed a more challenging roadblock. Upon graduating from
the university, each student was given six months to
transfer both his/her hukou and dang'an. The latter is
the personal file that accompanies a Chinese person from
school to workplace; it sticks with the university
graduate and is relocated with him/her whenever jobs are
changed. Dang'an is often translated as dossier, which
gives a rather negative connotation in English. The
Chinese term renders no such judgment. Students I
interviewed accepted the dang'an as a bureaucratic
artifact, but they were well aware of its policing
nature.23 Often hukou and dang'an are referred to in the
same breath.24 Both are part of the "four don't wants"
and "five don't needs" referred to above, which suggests
a trend that they are becoming less important.
Each year during his/her study a szu student is
required to complete a self-assessment form. One of its
purposes is to serve as a basis for the awarding of
scholarships according to the three goods: good academic
performance, good health, and good conduct. Its other
use is for inclusion in the personal file. The completed
form, with notations from the department head and
department-level party secretary, is included in the
dang'an. The file, which is about a half-inch thick when
at szu, contains a resum, autobiography, appraisals,
assessments, and materials relating to any
investigations, organizational and CCP activities,
rewards, punishments, appointments, removals.25
One of the major uses of the dang'an is for
assessment by CCP officials when an applicant applies for
party membership. It is used in screening for membership
in the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL)26 and party
membership in workunits.27 At szu almost all students
are members of the CCYL, but only one or two graduates
each year are permitted to join the CCP before they
graduate. These membership selections at szu are based
largely on personal relationships, similar to the general
situation in Tianjin where "one's relationship with the
party secretary is a decisive factor for party membership
attainment.28 The dang'an at szu, therefore, serves
little political function in a procedure where selection
is based on relationships, not objective criteria.
The dang'an is not an open file: it cannot be viewed
by the student. In fact, it cannot even be perused by
the potential employer, until after the student is hired
and formally transferred to the workunit. At that time,
the student personally carries the sealed and chopped
file and surrenders it to the workunit. But the file can
be used by school officials, like department leaders,
class advisors or placement officials in the job search
process. In the 1985 experiment conducted by Shanghai
Jiaotong, class advisors were given access to the dang'an
and could serve as a "bridge" between students and
potential employers.29 At szu, however, the dang'an is
not used in the job search process. This is due to the
several reasons. The files are kept in a special locked
office, and retrieving them requires initiating a
bureaucratic procedure that most officials would prefer
to avoid. Obtaining the file is likely to cost the
seeker in that s/he is like to have to repay the favour.
Second, career counselling no longer exists; the job
placement office provides no counselling and no staff
within the academic departments serve as job advisors
(See Chapter VI). Unlike at Jiaotong, szu abandoned the
class advisor system-- these so-called "bridges"--in the
late 1980s. Third, the dang'an is associated with
political activity which, at szu, is proscribed except
for certain events, such as the point where student self-
assessments are reviewed by leaders and then included in
the files. The political process takes place at
specified times, by schedule--at the student's university
entry, during annual review and periodic special reviews,
and prior to graduation. If a leader were to make a
special request for a student's dang'an, his/her stated
reasons and sub-surface motives would be examined. S/he
would have to make a formal request. According to one of
my informants, political actions out of the ordinary are
often suspect and must be taken with great care. This
caution is especially practised by officials who lived
through the "ten years of chaos," also known as the
Cultural Revolution.
How do students deal with the dang'an? Those hired
by municipal bureaux or state-owned companies simply
transfer the dang'an to their new workunit, at the same
time the hukou is relocated. What about students who
don't work for state bureaux or companies? Several of
the interviewees provide some enlightenment. One
company, a 100% foreign capitalized company in the Bank
of China group, is considered a foreign company (Case
35). It pays 800 per annum to the Labour Bureau for
keeping her dang'an. Another foreign company pays the
Labour Bureau 150 per month for keeping the dang'an, and
duns the employee's salary accordingly (Case 5). Another
way of handling this issue is recounted by a graduate:
When I graduated I went to work for the Construction
Bank and my dang'an went with me. The job was not
challenging. A friend introduced me to a man who
had a business at the racecourse in Guangzhou. I
wanted to try a new experience so I decided to take
a job there. I went to the Labour Bureau and they
agreed to keep my dang'an for 800 for a 12-month
period. I still had good relations at the bank, so
I just left my dang'an there. I went to Guangzhou
for five months, then I came back to work in one of
the largest companies in Shenzhen, where a vice-
director got me a job. After the probation period,
I transferred my dang'an (Case 19).
Tracking procedures for the dang'an are managed by each
individual company. Accounting can be slow and, unless
someone in the company wants to remove the dang'an, it
can lie dormant for a period of time. Two cases
illustrate: One student has had five jobs in the four
years since he graduated (Case 24). His dang'an has
stayed with his second employer, a state company. He
says the company doesn't mind, and he doesn't have to pay
any one. Another student's situation is similar (Case
21). He graduated in 1989 when joint ventures were eager
to attract university graduates. His first employer, a
joint venture, sent his dang'an to the labour exchange,
paying 600 per month. Since then, he has taken four
jobs but has not stayed at any past the year-long
probation, which also serves as a waiting period before
his dang'an can be transferred. At some point, he
explained, he may transfer the dang'an but this will
entail negotiations with the Labour Bureau as his
payments are in arrears.
Thus, a student can sometimes keep a dang'an at a
workunit regardless of whether he works there. For
example, after serving as a tour guide and working in a
hotel, one graduate took a job with a Japanese company
(Case 11). All the time, his dang'an has been in a state-
run company where his father is an assistant manager. He
could chose to place his dang'an at the Labour Bureau,
but he explains:
Some time in the future I might need to get
certifications or chops. I would much rather deal
with friends in my father's company than with the
Labour Bureau.
His Japanese company pays 500 per month for taking care
of the dang'an, an amount which is not a real cost to the
company because this comes from the 60% of his gross
salary that is retained anyway by the Foreign Service
Labour Bureau. In Shenzhen and elsewhere in China
foreign companies pay their Chinese employees via the
Labour bureau so that employees end up with 40% of what
the company pays out in salary. Another graduate, who
works for a shipping supply firm owned by a Chinese
businessman, keeps his dang'an at a state company that
does business with his employer, a private Chinese firm
(Case 3). He pays the state company 555 every three
months. Periodically, he says, they clean out the bogus
dang'an. "You have to be careful your's doesn't get
thrown in the rubbish when they're sweeping up." This
students' former roommate keeps his dang'an at szu, where
his mother works (Case 12). Despite the school's stated
regulations, he says the officials in charge don't mind
keeping it although one day he may have to pay. He also
admits his mother has good relations with the staff in
the personnel office who monitor dang'an comings and
goings. Finally, another case shows how a student takes
care of the dang'an. He worked one and a half years as
an accountant in a hotel (Case 24). Then some classmates
convinced him to work in the real estate market in the
boomtown of Beihai in Guangxi province. He transferred
his dang'an to the Labour Bureau through the good offices
of a joint-venture where one of his former classmates is
a vice-manager. He pays the joint-venture 2,000 a year
for this.
Keeping a dang'an at a state-company that is not the
employee's actual workunit appears to be either an
expansive interpretation of the rules, or blatantly
against them. If a graduate works for a private company,
whether foreign or domestic, the employer has the option
of placing the employee's dang'an with the Municipal
Labour Bureau. Other private employers are not willing
to absorb this expense. Companies discussed above,
ranging from a private Chinese employer, a Japanese
electronics firm or a foreign capitalized bank which
hires university graduates for clerical and data
processing tasks, refuse to take care of the dang'an.
One woman who worked for the foreign bank before
transferring to a state banking company, shows how she
solved the dang'an problem (Case 26).
Since I am a Guangzhou person but want to stay in
Shenzhen for my career in banking, I decided that
Citybank would be a good place to start. Foreign
banks are more demanding and you can learn many more
things. My hukou wasn't a problem. I had friends
where I could put it. But the dang'an was more
troublesome. While I was a student at Shenda [szu],
I tutored a little girl in English. Her father
offered to put my dang'an in the state company where
he worked. I was so happy and I didn't have to pay
even one fen.
Her case is especially interesting, as her story
continues.
After I worked for Citybank for almost two years, I
realized that I had learned all they could teach me
and I would never get promoted over the Hong Kong
people who ran the office. So I took a job with a
large, local bank where I had good relations. They
wanted to hire me because of my experience with
Citybank, because of my level of English, and
because I was familiar with Western banking. I knew
when I took the job, they would send me to Hong
Kong. Before they could get me a passport for
staying in Hong Kong, they needed my dang'an. To
transfer my dang'an to the bank, I went to the
personnel office of the company where my dang'an
was. But they said I had not been with them for the
five years of my contract. Actually, I never worked
there (I worked for citybank) and I signed a
contract only so they would keep my dang'an. My
friends had told me that signing the contract was
just a matter of form. But they were not going to
release me. The parents of the little girl I
tutored did not want me to go to Hong Kong. Anyway,
during this period, I was extremely busy and I no
longer had time to tutor the little girl (whose
English wasn't improving very much despite my help).
For several months, I tried to get the dang'an but
failed. Eventually, my new bank got me a business
travel document, valid for one week's stay in Hong
Kong. Now, I go to Hongkong every week, stay six
days in an apartment the bank provides, and come
back to Shenzhen on Sunday. I get a new visa at the
border every Monday.
But probably the most intriguing case is that of a
graduate from Guangzhou (Case 7). While a student, he
had been a dynamic individual who had had numerous
projects going simultaneously. Entering the world of
work, he found himself torn between taking two jobs. One
was with a city bureau that paid almost nothing (200)
but could take care of his dang'an, but not his housing.
The other was a Hongkong owned business, which was
willing to give him housing but not much else. Neither
of the jobs, both in related but not overlapping areas of
marketing, would demand his full energy. So he made what
he considered the only reasonable decision: he took both
jobs. One provided housing and required he work
evenings. The other, took care of his dang'an, and he
worked days. After a few months, he quit both and took a
job with a municipal bureau. His new employer took care
of both hukou and dang'an.
In sum, there are a variety of ways for dealing with
the dang'an. State employers usually take the dossier of
new recruits who are hired as full-timers. Individual
employees (Case 19) as well as foreign employers can pay
the Labour Bureau to keep a staff member's dossier (Cases
11, 5, 35). While these procedures look similar and may
use the administrative forms, the charges vary according
to procedures (or perhaps even rules) which no one seems
to be able to discern. Other students (Cases 7, 26, 12,
3, 21, 24) use imaginative ways to deal with the dang'an.
Any rigor and unbending bureaucratism implied in the
concept of dossier has been supplanted to a large degree
by a system characterized by flexibility and personal
relationships. The dang'an is a formally rigid system,
which is actually quite flexible. Still, a major
question remains: why all this fuss over the dang'an?
The answer lies in the dang'an's connection with cadre
status.
Status Control (Cadre Status)
Job allocation plans and cadre quotas allotted to
workunits were part of the same package both before the
cultural revolution and shortly thereafter.30 By 1984
the government had abandoned the policy that had been in
place since 1977 and stopped recruiting cadres from
universities because they lacked practical experience and
special ability to handle problems.31 In that year, the
state adopted a brief policy of sending graduates to the
countryside, reminiscent of the late '50s and early '60s
era. Thus, in the summer of 1990, "The state assignment
as "cadre" was perceived by many students as little other
than a sentence to a stultifying career in a stagnant
bureaucracy, most likely not near home but in an
uncertain locations.32 But this policy seems to have
been short-lived in most of China and was never applied
in Shenzhen.
Tracing the history of the concept of cadre (ganbu)
in Chinese communism, Schurmann33 arrives at a definition
that includes both formal position and leadership style.
The latter can be exemplified by the revolutionary
military leader who achieved "solidarity." In 1949 the
new China faced a shortage of trained manpower. The
cadre, recruited into the government apparatus when
technical skills were greatly needed, was supposed to be
both an institutional and a personal leader--"expert and
red" at the same time. Cadres were trained to work in
narrow specialities .34 Bian35 includes CCP membership
for the definition used in his analysis. Huang36
suggests a confusion in the term's contemporary usage.
Cadre is used in the broad sense to denote all
functionaries working in party, state and mass
organizations; but in the narrow sense, it refers to
personnel performing certain managerial functions. From
my discussions with Shenzhen people, I see the public's
perception of cadres as the "leaders" of workunits and,
by logical extension, this includes "future leaders," in
other words, the newly hired university graduates who are
expected eventually to become leaders, so they too are
considered cadres.
Students are cadres but their status differs when
they get to the workplace. Cadre status is tied to the
dang'an, ganbu dang'an, as opposed to files for workers
(gongren dang'an) or students (xuesheng dang'an).37
Cadre is now becoming synonymous with college-educated,
as most of the new generation of political elite in the
sez have gone through university.38 In fact, an
influential Chinese intellectual even suggested that by
the year 2000, all cadres should be university graduates,
all cadres at the county level should have an M.A.
degree, and all leaders at the provincial and ministerial
level should hold a Ph.D.39 For graduates who wish to
climb a career ladder, ganbu status is requisite. The
system, however, has occasionally come under fire. A
major criticism among educationalists is that cadre
status is conferred automatically on university
graduates, without competition, or based on a leader's
recommendation rather than assessment according to
objective criteria.40 The division of cadres versus
workers also causes underdevelopment of the labour
market.41 Since there are often more graduates than
cadre quotas, a mismatch occurs.42 In 1991, for example,
workunits in one region had a 4,000 cadre quota but there
were 6,400 graduates.43 Several authors 44 go as far as
to suggest that cadre status should be made available for
any student whom state companies enrol.
Cadre status plays into a network of relationships
in the political arena that can create dilemmas for those
who feel obligations to repay favours. Nathan45
illustrates this in a story that took place during the
1980 student disturbances. At that time there was a
student leader, Tao Sen, who had earlier sought help from
a cadre, Wang Zhen, in the rehabilitation of Tao's father
after the cultural revolution. At the time of the
disturbances, Wang was a Politburo member and vice
premier:
When the call [to the students] came, it was from
Tao Sen's old contact, Wang Zhen...He was a native
of Tao Sen's hometown in Hunan and apparently an old
commander of Tao's father. Since Tao had played on
this connection to clear his father, now Wang was
playing on it to solve the Changsha crisis...Wang's
request brought into the open a split among the
students. Some had believed from the start that Tao
Sen was making a mistake when he tried to solve the
problem "through the back door" by sending personal
telegrams to Wang Zhen...urged that Tao refuse Wang
Zhen's phone call. Tao did refuse Wang's first
call, but took a second several hours later.46
The wind from Beijing is pretty clear. The 1993
educational reforms advocate changing the past situation
where graduates were guaranteed jobs and cadreship
because of the adaptation of the market system.47 SEdC
officials lecture local educationalists that reform
requires changing the "guaranteeing graduates jobs" and
"guaranteeing graduates to become cadres" way of
thinking.48 A SEdC policy report also questions whether
students should automatically receive cadre status, given
that higher education is not compulsory and given the
trend toward fee-paying students and non-assignment of
jobs.49 Students become unmotivated, according to the
report, because they know they will automatically become
state cadres upon graduation. The report recommends that
cadre status be based on supply/demand, not on a rigid
quota system.50 Earlier policy documents recommended
that departments dealing with job assignments take into
account the number of tertiary graduates; the demand side
of the equation was not addressed.51
Just as education is the passport to upward
mobility, cadre status is the gateway to power, wealth
and prestige. Beginning with the dimension of power, in
China rural cadres control villagers' "life chances."52
They are benefitting the most from the open-door
reforms.53 The situation is similar in post-Mao urban
China. Cadres, along with workplace managers, are the
"new redistributors," empowered to allocate bonuses among
employees, distribute information about job assignments,
assign jobs and permissions to change jobs.54 Although
the cadres control resources, they are under no strict
regulations on the use of their power.55 The power of
high level cadres over their inferiors is a decision-
making process based on relationships, not merit.56
Turning to the dimension of wealth, in rural China,
Yan57 has pointed out an upward flow of gifts, from
villages to cadres and from lower rank cadres to their
superiors. Urban cadres can also get wealthy by
receiving gifts of money, goods or services in exchange
for providing help.58 One of my former students and now
a low-level cadre in the Customs Inspection Bureau, told
me he earns at least 60% more than his salary in this way
(Case 6). One of his classmates who is a cadre, works as
a salesman for an import-export company (Case 33). He
says that he and his colleagues double their salary
through commissions. In Shenzhen, the term commission
means something quite different from the way it is used
in the U.S..
American companies often retain salesmen on
commissions, as an incentive and reward to the most
productive employees. This supplements a salary that is
usually low. In China, the salary is low (this student
earns about 2,000 with bonus), but the company does not
pay commissions. Rather, the employee gets supplementary
income from the other party--either a foreign company
buying Chinese goods or a Chinese factory providing
merchandise which Zhang's company finds a buyer for. If
anything, market reforms have enhanced the power of
cadres in bureaux because the new business class are
still often dependant on cadres' good will.59
Prestige for cadres flows directly from their wealth
and power. The classification of "leading cadre" is one
of the ways survey researchers categorize occupations,
along with intellectual, regular cadre, farmer and worker
and farmer.60 A cadre's prestige is deemed high if he
(or sometimes she)
has the power or influence to break through the
bureaucratic control of opportunities...Unlike the
Western labour market, labour value is not measured
by economic variables such as skill, experience, or
education, but by the ability of individuals to
access power or influence, which in turn affect
one's status-attainment outcomes.61
Moreover, cadres are appointed by managers on the basis
of loyalty and obedience.62 Although some universities--
Beida63 and Qinghua64--serve as training grounds for
cadres, this is not the case at szu, where few students
are involved in political organizations, which are seen
by most students as weak and self-ingratiating. They are
seen as corrupt and largely ignored by most students.
This prestige that accompanies cadreship does not
terminate when one retires. Quite the opposite is true,
as retired cadres can "exploit the guanxi developed in
their professional careers to build their businesses"65
or serve as purchasing agents for their old danwei.66
According to official documents, Shenzhen allots one
third of its cadre quota for new higher education
graduates, a category into which szu graduates fall.67
The rest of the cadre positions go to non-tertiary
graduates or to those who transfer jobs. The quota size
varies from year to year, but appears to average around
2,500 to 3,000. Thus, szu's graduating class compete
with other graduates for about 1,000 places a year.
Several different informants reported that szu graduates
get about 1 out of 6 new cadre positions in Shenzhen,
which would amount to about 160 per year. The 1993
survey data suggests about 300 graduates work for bureaux
and state companies. All this suggests competition as
only about half of the graduates can get cadre status, at
least initially upon graduation. Since cadre status is
automatically held for only six months after
commencement, graduates then lose this status if they (1)
have not found a job with a state bureau or company or
(2) have not secured a home for the dang'an at the labour
bureau. Students who are unable to secure cadre status
immediately upon graduation, may choose to develop
relationships and secure cadre status on job change, as
was the case for Case 26, who transferred from Citybank
to a state bank. Given the intense competition, the role
of pulling guanxi becomes important.
It seems to be widely assumed in the prc that the
cadre system will eventually be abolished when China more
fully achieves a market economy. Criticisms of cadreship
were published during the open period preceding
Tiananmen. The head of the Beijing Personnel Evaluation
and Examination Centre commented:68
Corrupt practices in the appointment and promotion
of cadres and the suppression of real talents are
two deep-seated problems of the system...Favouritism
in appointing cadres is widespread despite the
admonition to appoint cadres on their merits. Many
mediocre cadres hold their positions because they
are good at currying favour with their superiors,
while many promising ones are denied the opportunity
to display their talents simply because a leader may
have taken a personal disliking to them.
The question becomes not whether the system will be
abolished, but how. During the early '90s, it is being
phased out (cadre status is not automatic in all state
companies). State bureaux are likely the last to abandon
the system and that may not occur for years.
Housing Control through the Danwei69
To paraphrase an earlier question, why all the fuss over
cadre status? The hukou, dang'an, and cadre status all
led down a well-defined road. The destination: housing.
Despite the formation of a private housing market,
Shenzhen people resemble other Chinese who prefer to live
in apartments owned by the workunits than acquire their
own flats.70
For developed countries, housing is not such an
important determinant in choosing a job. In a study
before the collapse of European communism, West Germans,
for example, rated housing a distant fourth element in
determining work satisfaction.71 Other factors were more
important: proximity of work to residence, relevance of
work to qualifications, interest, and challenge. China's
situation more resembles the former centrally planned
economies of Poland and the USSR where poor housing
conditions were found to be among the major reasons given
for changing jobs.72
Given Shenzhen's rapid economic growth and massive
in-migration,73 it's not surprising that housing has
become a problem. In privatizing the market, the
government has allowed supply and demand to set prices.74
Unfortunately for Shenzhen people, the price reflects a
demand from across the border. Hong Kong residents,
lured by housing prices one quarter of their own, have
driven up both the rents and the sales prices of Shenzhen
housing.75
Since from at least the establishment of the prc in
1949, housing has been low quality, in short supply and
bureaucratically controlled.76 It became an important
determinant in how one chooses a career77 and even in
mate selection.78 Since urban housing is mostly provided
through workunits, it became a key ingredient in what
Walder79 calls a clientelist bureaucracy, where guanxi
plays a major role in the housing allocation process.
Housing, in fact, has become a reward that managers give
employees.80 Whether a workunit can provide housing
determines the status of the unit. In sum, "One's access
to housing and community resources is thus conditioned by
one's workunit."81 Often, the more desired workunits
offer the best housing. Simply, that's why they are
considered more desirable.
The criteria used for distributing housing are
extremely complex. Yang presents a list of 12 items
where "the conception of neediness is intertwined with
the normative categories of the `deserving'."82 The
complexity of the criteria makes it virtually impossible
to compute a legal-rational, merit-based system, even
with the use of computers. The power of the individual
official in charge of distribution becomes of tantamount
importance. Yang concludes: "...the art of guanxi
redistributes what the state economy has already
distributed, according to the person's own
interpretations of need and the advantages of horizontal
social relationships." 83 Thus, the road to housing,
which runs through a danwei, has a variety of on-ramps,
most of which involve guanxi. This applies to workers in
Tianjin,84 Beijing,85 and in Guangdong.86 What about
Shenzhen?
The data from szu graduates in 1993 and 1994 confirm
the findings for elsewhere in China. As shown in earlier
chapters, both student's sex and their type of workunit
are predictors of housing. Male recruits have a better
chance for getting accommodation than females (See Table
5.4). Those who work for state bureaux or companies are
more likely to get housing than graduates who choose
joint ventures. The latter, in turn, are more likely to
get housing than those who work for 100% foreign firms
(see Table 5.5).
The survey shows a direct relationship between use
of guanxi and getting housing (Table 5.6, t=2.98,
p=.003). It is also statistically significant that
students who admit to using the backdoor are more likely
to get housing (Table 5.7, t=2.88, p0.01). Responses to
two other opinion questions show that those who get
housing agree more with the statements "Many classmates
use guanxi" and "I used guanxi, but not the backdoor"
than graduates who did not get housing (Table 5.8,
t=2.22, p=.03; Table 5.9, t=2.86, p=.005). This may
suggest that housing-seekers, who are often guanxi-users,
tend to make friends with their own kind. Or perhaps
those who don't use guanxi are a bit ignorant of the
facts of life.
One of the major reasons why students who are not
Shenzhen residents return to their hometowns to work is
that they are not able to get housing in a Shenzhen
workunit. Indeed, housing problems are more easily
resolved in one's hometown.87 The inability to get
housing is a commonly held fear, although a large number
of non-residents-- 47.9%--are able to get accommodation.
Still, many choose to return home. One student provides
an illustration (Case 9).
I worked as a tour guide with [a tour company] for
four years. I made good money from tips. They gave
me a dormitory room. But the company is not
building housing for its workers. Without housing,
I won't be able to get a wife. So I took all my
tips and went back to my hometown, Jiangmen, and
bought an apartment. I would rather stay and work
in Shenzhen, but what can I do? So my father was
able to find me a job in Jiangmen. At least I have
solved the housing problem.
Regional Employment
Chapter II suggested that the movement away from manpower
planning was not strongly based on an assessment of the
policy's performance. Rather more important was the
notion that "the invisible hand of the market" should be
allowed to guide China's development into the next
millennium. The invisible hand pushed manpower planning
aside. These changes may be viewed as quasi
globalization, a superficial adoption of a Western
application without a full understanding by policy-makers
of the depth of this application or the extent to which
it was supported in the West by other elements (e.g.,
information systems, greater supply-demand balance,
strong bureaucracy and regulations).
This section concerns Shenzhen University graduates'
working in Hong Kong. Crossing national boundaries is
what globalization is all about. I will argue that while
inter-regional manpower flows appears to be a Western
application, what happens around the Shenzhen-Hong Kong
border retains elements that are more closely related to
previous Chinese patterns.
In the 1990s the world seems to be moving toward
regional employment. Two global events point toward
increased geographic mobility among employees. The
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the lowering of barriers in the European
Community that had restricted nationals from working in
other countries both addressed the concern that a free
market works most effectively if not hindered by non-
economic forces, in other words, if not hindered by
political boundaries. In Asia, as the economies of the
Newly Industrializing Countries prosper, an intra-
regional flow of labour is occurring.88 Will China
become part of this trend or will past patterns continue?
For the past century China's labour flow has moved
in the outbound direction, with Chinese citizens
emigrating abroad.89 In August, 1993, some 200,000 prc
nationals were officially working abroad.90 Asian
countries absorb 60% of the exported labour. Hong Kong
is the single largest market, with 15% of the contract,
or 30,000. More recently, since the beginning of China's
Reform Era, over 100,000 Chinese students have gone to
work abroad. Most appear to be emigrating, rejecting
their Chinese residence to become permanent "overseas
Chinese." It was not until the 1990s that Chinese
university graduates were permitted through organized
programs to work in Hong Kong as temporary workers, with
the expectation of returning to China. In the following
discussion, several questions will be addressed. To what
extent are Shenzhen University graduates becoming part of
a regional employment market? How do the trends that are
now appearing relate to the notion that Shenzhen career
development is being affected by the invisible hand of
the market? To what degree does this invisible hand
cross political boundaries?
Given the laws of supply and demand, employers
choose the best qualified candidates according to their
particular hiring criteria while job seekers pursue
employment according to their own personal sets of
criteria. Certain market flaws result from an imperfect
information flow as well as from political roadblocks to
the free flow of personnel. Both of these obstacles to
free employment practices have been evident in the past
along the Shenzhen-Hong Kong border.
Cross border movement of both capital and workers is
not new. During the last decade it has become an aspect
of global economic restructuring with the "relocation of
clerical and data entry jobs to countries whose
comparative advantage lies in a low-wage, well-educated
workforce."91 From the end of World War II, most of the
migrants to Hong Kong have come from China, and many of
the Colony's manual labourer jobs have been filled by
these immigrants. Since the 1960s Hong Kong
manufacturing firms have been relocating to southern
China to the extent that some 25,000 Hong-Kong
capitalized factories in the prc now employ three million
Mainland workers.92 Now, Hong Kong employers are
relocating clerical jobs, as illustrated by CityBank,
which moved its data processing operation to Shenzhen.93
As Hong Kong's economy has expanded, its work-force has
matured, and employment as a whole has expanded in the
professional and service classes. Indeed, the manpower
projections for the year 2001 forecast an oversupply of
university graduates but a shortage of candidates for
jobs requiring less education.94 Since 1989 Hong Kong
has authorized a labour import program for blue collar
workers, many in the construction industry, and in total
they are expected to represent 0.6% of the projected
total labour supply for the year 2001. Legal migrants
from China to Hong Kong are regulated by quota at about
27,000 per year.95
While Hong Kong has brought in manual workers from
China for decades, just recently professionals have also
been imported. Several reasons account for this new
twist on policy, which is manifested in the several pilot
programs discussed below. First, in the run-up to 1997
when Hong Kong's sovereignty returns to China, the colony
has seen some emigration (brain drain seems rather
hyperbolized) of its educated class. Although the
numbers are small, the perception among the public causes
anxiety that a greater exodus will occur as it did in the
years following the Tiananmen events of spring/summer
1989. Although these concerns that Hong Kong would lose
its best and brightest were recently mitigated by a
worldwide recession that discouraged Hong Kong people
from working abroad,96 the fear persists that Hong Kong
will face a shortage of professionals. Hong Kong
government planners suggest this will not be the case.
Projecting a growing economy with an increasingly
dominant service sector, the 1994 manpower report says
that "the supply of graduate manpower will be growing
faster than the demand during 1997 to 2001 as the impact
of the tertiary education expansion on the supply is
fully felt."97 It admits, however, that "[d]emand for
graduate manpower may soon exceed supply again beyond
2001 as the economic development of China, and hence Hong
Kong, continues to expand."98
Another change in public attitude, again influenced
by the 1997 turnover, is a recognition that Hong Kong
should become better integrated with the prc. Given
Britain's and China's inability to agree on a political
system for Hong Kong, the economy offers an opportunity
where consensus may be possible. Establishing a regional
employment market offers one such opportunity. A third
underlying basis for public approval of these programs is
the perception of "falling language standards" among Hong
Kong employees, from middle managers to workers in
tourism.99 The prc is seen as a reservoir of English
speakers. Finally, employers in the colony need persons
with certain skills such as "analysts in financial
institutions and as lawyers and consultants to firms
doing China projects."100 In other words, Mainlanders
are sought for their familiarity with the way China
operates and for their networks of relationships that
could benefit the Hong Kong employer.
Several imported labour schemes involving
professionals were underway by the mid-1990s. In the
spring, 1994, the Hong Kong government initiated a plan
to import 1,000 mainland management professions.101
Applicants were restricted to graduates of one of China's
36 key universities, from which szu was excluded. All
applications were funnelled through the prc State
Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, three
mainland corporations and the Ministry of External Trade
and Economic Co-operation. Another scheme, a "Bank
Teller Program," permitted two Hong Kong banks to hire up
to 400 clerical staff from China.102. Staff are
recruited through labour bureaux in Shenzhen and
Guangdong, are trained in Hong Kong to work as tellers in
branch banks, and receive net pay of about HK $5,500 per
month. This scheme grew out of the banks' inability to
hire locally to address the high turnover rate among
tellers (25% per annum). The China imported labour must
have work experience, university degrees, English
proficiency and pass several interviews.
The two programs described above share certain
characteristics. First, they are meritocracy-based. A
complicated hiring process in the first program is
"designed to rule out corruption and the employment of
workers on false grounds."103 Likewise, in the Bank
Teller Program positions are publicly advertised in China
and the application process is fair and open.104
Application forms are available to all. This presents a
sharp contrast to data presented earlier in this chapter.
The "need to break the queue" reflects a supply-demand
imbalance in municipal bureau and state-run companies.
This imbalance is a common phenomenon in many other
facets of life in Shenzhen, violently demonstrated with
the Shenzhen 1992 stock market riot where share-holder
hopefuls expressed their anger at not being able to get
applications through the "front door."105
Another common feature of the two programs is that
both are pilot programs--cautious first steps toward a
regional employment market. At their creation they were
not meant to be permanent, and they are continually
monitored and assessed. Thus, they are greatly
influenced by shifting market factors as well as by
political considerations. In fact, the expansion of the
1989 import labour scheme was promoted as a way to stem
wage inflation by expanding the supply of workers.106
Generally, despite the programs' merits as advocated by
economists and government planners, these innovations are
understandably opposed by labour unions because they are
perceived as "taking local jobs."107 Despite
reassurances from the banking industry that the Chinese
workers are only temporary and are not considered regular
staff,108 Hong Kong tellers do in fact feel threatened
and have voiced their concerns in the local media.109
In one respect the two programs described above are
quite different from each other. The former recruits
managers and professionals who work in their areas of
expertise, presumably on an equal basis with local hires
of similar education and work experience. Since they are
hired on terms specific to the program, they are treated
as ex-patriate, not local, employees. They are hired to
provide skills not available in candidates in the local
work force.
The latter scheme, in contrast, recruits university
graduates from China to perform jobs usually filled by
Hong Kong secondary graduates who have not had further
education. The Mainland recruits have five years more
education than locally hired bank tellers. Additionally,
the Mainlanders work in Hong Kong on a two-year contract,
which may possibly be renewable. They are not permitted
to remain in Hong Kong past the termination of their
contracts. It was indicated at the outset that they
would not be permitted to work for another employer or
transfer to a job other than the one for which they were
hired. Even those recruited tellers deemed to have
exceptional talent and management potential cannot be
promoted. While the first program puts Mainlanders on an
equal footing with local hires, the latter scheme treats
the prc hires in a way that does not fully utilize their
education, or presumably abilities and talent.
It is possible, however, that when the Mainland-
educated workers return to the prc, they may use the
skills and training they acquired as part of their work
experience in Hong Kong. Also, according to Hong Kong
Bank staff involved in policy-making whom I interviewed,
these returned workers are expected to provide a
reservoir of talent which the banks may later draw on
when they establish full-service facilities on the
Mainland, an event that is likely to occur as China opens
up its banking system to foreign banks. Until that
occurrence, the fact remains that the Bank Teller Program
provides for underemployment of Mainland graduates.
University graduates do not serve as bank tellers in
China; tertiary graduates of Hong Kong schools do not
work as bank clerks in Hong Kong. Serving as a teller is
not part of a management training program, for they are
not permitted to be promoted into management tracks; in
the future they may work for branches of the Hong Kong
banks when the institutions are permitted to expand to
China. But, for now, the teller job is not expected to
lead to career advancement. This is sharp contrast with
the other program, the imported manager scheme, that is
expected to provide Mainlanders with challenging jobs
that use their talents.
A third import labour mechanism takes a side door
approach. Chinese nationals come to work in Hong Kong
for China-based companies, using either business
passports or 7-day entry documents. Two szu graduates
(Cases 36, 26) work in the Hong Kong offices of their
Shenzhen companies, a Shenzhen labour company and a bank.
They must return to China each Sunday as their visas are
only issued for one week per visit. Hired on the basis
of merit, these students were selected for their language
skills and overall abilities. They feel challenged by
their jobs. Both contribute to the flood of weekend
travellers who pass through the Lo Wu checkpoint.
Another graduate, who was hired by interview and
examination, was employed as a receptionist in the Hong
Kong office of a China-based construction company (Case
4). She was sent to Beijing for a week of political
education, compulsory for employees who are expected to
be out of the Mainland for more than six months. She has
a Chinese public affairs passport and temporary residence
in Hong Kong. Her job, which is answering the office
phone, fails to challenge her.
The important question, thus, is which of these
several schemes is the harbinger of the future? Will
future plans that promote regional employment reflect
equality or exploitation? Employing Mainland graduates
and underusing their talents indeed interferes with
market mechanisms. The shortage of applicants for teller
positions in Hong Kong is partly due to the fact that the
job is low paying in the eyes of potential Hong Kong
applicants and chances for promotion are slight. The
free market response should be to force the banks to
raise wages. Instead, the importation of Mainland
workers permits the wages to remain low. That immigrants
take low paying jobs that residents find undesirable is
not a new phenomenon unique to Hong Kong.110 Spanish
speaking immigrants in California have a virtual monopoly
over the household servant and agricultural worker
sectors because American citizens don't want these jobs.
The difference is that given time these workers set up
their own businesses, change jobs, provide better
education for their children. Social mobility may
follow. In the Hong Kong case, however, neither the bank
tellers nor the imported managers have the opportunities
for promotion or education. They cannot bring their
families with them. The jobs, in a sense, are dead end.
The workers may earn more than they do in China; they may
get new life experiences by living in Hong Kong; and they
may even acquire skills that can advance their carriers
in the prc. But the jobs do little to increase one's
overall life chances. Any upward mobility is restricted
to the prc. The globalization concept of a world market
place, an economic globe without borders, does not at
present apply to the Hong Kong-China professional labour
market. The existence of the banks' pilot program
described above does not suggest this situation will
change. The other two programs, however, use graduates'
special talents, namely, familiarity with prc procedures
and work environment. Given the colony's surplus of
university graduates, Hong Kong does not need to recruit
Shenzhen University graduates. Those who cross into Hong
Kong have fewer opportunities for mobility than the
Spanish speaking fruit pickers and maids who work in
Southern California. The latter at least may see inter-
generational advances as their children and grandchildren
eventually become part of American society.
Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with several concerns facing
students during the job hunt. First, a sez hukou must be
established for those whose parents do not live in
Shenzhen. Then, the dang'an must find a home if
graduates are to retain their cadre status, a necessity
if one wants employer-provided housing. At each step
along the way human relationships come into play.
Bureaucrats, officials and party cadres retain much
discretion in the handling of the dang'an, which
translates as cadre status, which in turn leads to
housing. All these considerations apply to those who
wish to remain within public sector employment.
Relations are of penultimate importance.
Thus, a final question to raise is: how does
location affect the use of relationships in job
procurement? The survey data from the 1993 graduating
class show that both sez residents and non-residents
admit to using relationships to about the same degree.
Students who live in Shenzhen use relations more than non-
Shenzhen residents, but the difference is not
statistically significant (t=1.4; p=.16). Local males
use more guanxi than males from outside Shenzhen, and the
difference is closer to approaching statistical
significance (t=1.76; p=.08). The variable that produces
statistical significance is housing. For those who don't
get housing benefits, there is no difference in guanxi
use, whether one lives in or outside the sez. For those
who got housing, in contrast, sez residents report they
use significantly more guanxi (t=4.03; p<.001). Thus,
one can theorize that guanxi use somewhat follows the
housing path. Some relationships are required to put the
dang'an in a proper nesting spot; better connections are
required to get an employer who will give you cadre
status; even more guanxi is necessary if you get housing.
All this suggests a rather dynamic picture. Cross-
border employment (i.e., working in Hong Kong) requires
no guanxi. While it doesn't take too much guanxi to stay
in the economic zone (the hukou requirement), to
successfully navigate through the dang'an/cadre/housing
maze requires pulling all the strings available. My
interviews confirm that students with parents who have
remained in their native places are not likely to have
the necessary relationships in the sez, and that they are
either (1) more likely to have connections back home
where their parents live, or (2) connections are not as
necessary to obtain the goal of housing.
Any reform of the job placement system would need to
take into account the dynamics of the job search--the
role of hukou, dang'an and housing. These come under the
Rao et al.'s category of deeper-level factors that affect
reform.111 As long as the housing market is controlled
through the use of guanxi, guanxi will be important in
the job search.
_______________________________
1.Goodman (1995), "Collectives and Connectives, Capitalism and
Corporatism."
2.See, __, "Buzhun Ganshe Daxue Biyesheng Fenpei Gongzuo"
(1969) [No Intervention in the Job Assignment of College
Graduates].
3.Dutton (1992), Policing and Punishment in China; Romich
(1994), "Decentralisation and the Danwei System."
4.Cheng & Selden (1994), "The Origins and Social Consequences
of China's Hukou System."
5.White (1978), Careers in Shanghai, 170.
6.The numbers vary according to whose figures are used. For a
general discussion of temporary workers, see Mackerras
(1993), "Aspects of Social and Demographic Change in
Shenzhen Municipality."
7.Interview, Jack Wang, Dongguan King Key Toys Co, Ltd. April
1994.
8.These case numbers refer to individuals who are described in
Appendix E.
9.Yang (1986), The Art of Social Relationships and Exchanges
in China, 37-39.
10.White (1994), "Migrations and Politics on the Shanghai
Delta."
11.1990 Yearbook (1991), 179; Liu (1993), Book of Major
Educational Events, 1501, 1511, 1540.
12.Interviews, Shanghai Institute of Human Resource
Development, March 1994.
13.Handbook (1992), 292.
14.Interviews, March 1994.
15.Shanghai Jiaotong (1994), "Executive Measures for
Postgraduates for Jiaotong University in 1994."
16.Guo & Jiang (1990) "An Investigation of Job Assignments for
University Graduates and Thoughts Related to It; Guo
(1990), "A Retrospection on `Two-way Choice.'
17.Handbook (1992), 72.
18.Huang & Yu (1993), "Two-way Choice to Some Extent Should Be
the Main Channel for University Graduates' Finding Jobs."
19.Ibid.
20.Handbook (1992), 309-310.
21.Wei et al. (1992), "Planned Allocation, Two-way Choice, Job-
securement by Oneself."
22.South China Morning Post (Oct. 10, 1994): 8.
23.Dutton (1992), Policing and Punishment in China, 222-226.
24.Huang & Yu (1993), "Two-way Choice to Some Extent Should Be
the Main Channel;" Wei et al. (1992), "Planned
Allocation, Two-way Choice, Job-securement by Oneself;"
Liu (1993), Book of Major Educational Events, 1540;
Shanghai Jiaotong (1994), "Executive Measures for
Postgraduates for Jiaotong University in 1994;" 1990
Yearbook.
25.For a general discussion, see Dutton (1992), Policing and
Punishment in China, 224.
26.Shirk (1982), Competitive Comrades, 89.
27.Bian (1994), Work and Inequality in Urban China, 129.
28.Ibid., 144.
29.1988 Yearbook (1989), 218.
30.Regulations cited for 1963, in Handbook (1992), 105.
Regulations for 1981, in Ibid., 190.
31.This information comes from a 1989 Liao Wang article that
served to justify post June 4 policy. See, Mi & Xin
(1989), "Subjecting New University Graduates Training at
the Grass-roots Level Is an Important Measure to Nurture
Cadres."
32.Seeberg (1993), "Access to Higher Education."
33.Schurmann (1968), Ideology and Organization in Communist
China, 165-172.
34.Orleans (1987), "Soviet Influence on China's Higher
Education," 198.
35.Bian (1994), Work and Inequality in Urban China, 142.
36.Huang (1992), "Nonformal Education and Modernization."
37.Dutton (1992), Policing and Punishment in China, 222.
38.Li & Bachman (1989), "Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism."
39.Ibid., 88.
40.__, "Guanyu Jiakuai Gaige he Jiji Fazhan Putong Gaodeng
Jiaoyu de Yijian [Proposals on Speeding up Reform and
Active Development of Ordinary Higher Education]" (1992);
Yao (1989), "Official Says Cadre Evaluation System
Outdated;" Zhang (1993), "Quest for 1993 Shanghai
University Graduates Job Allocation System Reform;" Chen
(1990), "Study on Graduates Counseling under the Trend of
`Two-way Choice';" Wang (1993), "Gradually Establish
Higher Education Recruitment and Graduate Allocation
System;" Xu (1992) "On the System Reform of Ordinary
College's Recruitment and Job Assignment."
41.Tang (1993), "Ten Major Causes Of The Underdevelopment of
the Labour Market."
42.Lin (1990), "Strengthen Macroscopic Adjustment and Control
and Regain Initiative in Job Assignment of Graduate
Students."
43.Wang (1993), "Special Economic Zone Graduates Job
Allocation Under Market Economy."
44.Li & Chen, "Some Viewpoints on Two-way Choice Job
Allocation System for University Graduates."
45.Nathan (1985), Chinese Democracy, 216-217.
46.Ibid., 217.
47.SEdC (1993), "Opinions on Reform in Admission and Job
Assignment for College Students."
48.Jiao (1994), "Speech at the Planning Meeting for the
Employment of 1993 College and University Graduates."
49.Zhao (1993), Reform and Development, Ch.3, I-D.
50.Ibid., Ch. 3, II-C.
51.1990 Yearbook (1991), 181.
52.Yan (1993), The Flow of Gifts, 248.
53.Hu (1992), "On the Change of Guanxi in Rural Areas since
the Adoption of Reform and the Open-door Policy."
54.Bian (1994), Work and Inequality in Urban China, 17, 60,
97.
55.Zhu (1993), "Subculture of Guanxi Network in Chinese Social
Life."
56.Huang (1990) "Web of Interests and Patterns of Behavior of
Chinese Local Economic Bureaucracies and Enterprises
during Reforms."
57.Yan (1993), The Flow of Gifts, 167.
58.Bian (1994), Work and Inequality in Urban China, 97.
59.Solinger (1993), China's Transition from Socialism, 5.
60.Tian et al. (1992), "Analysis of Investigation into
University Students Attitude on Job Choice."
61.Bian (1994), Work and Inequality in Urban China, 98.
62.Luk (1998), Guanxi, 100.
63.Francis (1991), "The Institutional Roots of Student
Political Culture."
64.Li (1994), "University Networks and the Rise of Qinghua
Graduates in China's Leadership."
65.Bruun (1993), Business and Bureaucracy in a Chinese City,
87.
66.Luk (1988) Guanxi, 63-65.
67.Zheng & Duan (1994), "Take in All Sorts of Talents to Give
the Development of the Special Zone a Spur."
68.Yao (1989), "Official Says Cadre Evaluation System
`Outdated.'"
69.The importance of the danwei is discussed in Chapter III.
See also, Lu (1993), "The Origins and Formation of the
Unit (Danwei) System."
70.Kahn (1994), "Most Chinese, Given a Chance to Own, Opt to
Keep Cheap Rental Apartments."
71.Sanyal (1987), Higher Education and Employment, ch. 8.
72.Ibid., 163-4.
73.Mackerras (1993), "Aspects of Social and Demographic Change
in Shenzhen."
74.Sender (1993), "Shenzhen Started It."
75.Sender (1992), "And Now for China: Hongkong's Speculators
Move North of the Border."
76.Whyte & Parish (1984), Urban life in Contemporary China, 76-
77.
77.White (1978), Careers in Shanghai.
78.Whyte & Parish (1984), Urban life in Contemporary China,
127-8.
79.Walder (1986), Communist Neo-Traditionalism, 162, 185-6.
80.Bian (1994), Work and Inequality in Urban China, 189-206;
Yang (1986), The Art of Social Relationships and
Exchanges, 284.
81.Bian (1994), Work and Inequality in Urban China, 197.
82.Yang (1989), "The Gift Economy and State Power in China,"
29.
83.Ibid., 50, italics in original.
84.Bian (1994), Work and Inequality in Urban China.
85.Yang (1986), The Art of Social Relationships and Exchanges,
41, 151; Walder (1986), Communist Neo-Traditionalism,
185.
86.Luk (1988), Guanxi, 100.
87.Su & Wang (1989), "Three Favourite Trends in University
Students' Job Choices."
88.Pura et al. (1992), "On the Move: Asia's Dynamic Growth
Alters Labour Patterns;" Levinson (1994), "The Great Job
Hunt: Crossing Borders to Find Work."
89.Pan (1991), Sons of the Yellow Emperor.
90.China Daily, (October 23, 1993).
91.Moghadam (1995), "Gender Aspects of Employment and
Unemployment in a Global Perspective," 117.
92.__, "Local Firms Employ 3m in Mainland, Says Survey"
(1993), South China Morning Post (Oct. 27), Business, 3.
93.__, "Moving the Basics Overseas, (1992).
94.Hong Kong, Education and Manpower Branch (1994), Manpower
2001 Revisited, 52.
95.Ibid., 5.
96.Sanger (1994), "Ticket to a new life back home."
97.Hong Kong, Education and Manpower Branch (1994), Manpower
2001 Revisited, ix.
98.Ibid., x.
99.Cook (1994), "Language Help Call to China."
100.Yue (1994), "Employers View for Mainland Staff."
101.Ibid.
102.Yeung (1994), "Newcomers Take the Main Chance."
103.Yue (1994), "Employers Vie for Mainland Staff."
104.Leung, "Hongkong Bank Aims to Tame Shenzhen Go-getters."
105.Mooney (1992), "Irrational Rationing: Chaotic Shenzhen
Share Issue Reveals Basic Flaws."
106.Sherbin (1991), "Hong Kong studies ways to import more
workers."
107.Won & McKenzie (1994), "China Graduates to `Take Local
Jobs;'" Stine (1991), "Hong Kong Weighs Importing More
Labour."
108.See remarks by Brian Renwick, senior manager, personnel
department, Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, in
"Graduate Output and Graduate Employment in Hong Kong,"
seminar proceedings, University of Hong Kong, April 22,
1993, 91-92.
109. Radio Television Hong Kong, "Counting on Others," an
edition of Hong Kong Connection, broadcast in English on
December 22, 1993. The controversy over imported labour
started to boil during 1995 as the reported unemployment
rate rose. The issue came to a head when the Hong Kong
Governor, in his annual policy address, cut the quota for
imported labour.
110.About 135,000 Philippine nationals form the largest group
of resident foreigners in Hong Kong. Filipina women work
as domestics and men work in the restaurant and service
trade.
111.Rao et al. (1992), "Policy Analysis of the Early Stages
(1985-1991) of Reform of the Job Assignment System for
College Graduates."